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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether summary judgment in favor of the Defendant-Appellee Town of 
Big Water ("Big Water") was improper because the Big Water Board of 
Adjustment's ("Board") actions and/or decisions concerning approval for the 
Pyles' garage were arbitrary, capricious or illegal? Summary judgment is 
appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). In reviewing a 
grant of summary judgment, the appellate court does not defer to the legal 
conclusions of the district court, but reviews them for correctness. Springville 
Citizens v. Citv of Springville, 1999 UT 25, Tf22, 979 P.2d 332. When reviewing a 
municipality's land use decision, the appellate review is limited to determining 
whether the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. Id A municipality's land 
use decision is arbitrary and capricious if it is not supported by substantial 
evidence. Id at ^24. Substantial evidence is defined as "that quantum and quality 
of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a 
conclusion." Bradley v. Payson, 2003 UT 16, «|[14. This issue was preserved for 
appeal. See R. 44-57, 76-81. 
2. Whether summary judgment in favor of Big Water was improper 
considering the methods employed by Big Water to amend its ordinances so as to 
make the Pyles' previously nonconforming garage permissible? Summary 
judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
A lower court's interpretation of a statue is reviewed for correctness. See 
NexMed, Inc. v. Clealon Mann, 2005 UT App 431, }^12. This issue was preserved 
for appeal. SeeR. 194-200. 
3. Whether summary judgment in favor of Big Water was improper where the 
2,000 square foot garage, which is an accessory use and therefore dependent on 
the presence of another structure, is the only improvement on the lot? The 
ascertainment of what constitutes an accessory use customarily incidental to a 
single-family dwelling is a question of law. Town of Alta v. Ben Hame, 836 P.2d 
797, 800 (Utah Ct. App 1992). However, a reviewing court should afford some 
level of non-binding deference to the interpretation advanced by the local agency. 
Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98, f28, 104 P.3d 1208 (citations omitted). 
This issue was preserved for appeal. See R. 54. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND/OR REGULATIONS 
The determinative statutory provisions are found in the Municipal Land 
Use, Development, and Management Act (LUDMA) § 10-9-101, U.C.A. (2003), et 
seq. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case 
This is an appeal from a final order and judgment of the Sixth District 
Court, Kane County, Kanab Department, State of Utah, the Honorable Judge 
Wallace A. Lee presiding. Specifically, this is an appeal til motions (oi snnmmry 
judgment which were decided in favor of the defendant. R. 335-340. 
B. Course of proceedings relevant to this appeal 
Plaintiff-Appellant Richard Specht ("Specht") properly appealed a In mi use 
decision of Big Water tn I IK Sisth PMIIICH ouil V 1-2 Specht brought a 
motion for summary judgment arguing the decision of the Big Water Board of 
Adjustment was arbitrary, capricious and illegal and that, pursuant to I UDMA, 
Specht was entitled to a writ of mandamus R 5 7 1 1 Big W ater filed a ci c ss 
motion for summary judgment. R. 59-75. The District Court found in favor of 
Big Water. R. 91-93. The District Court noted that the only remaining issue was 
whether a Big Water ordinance was amended with proper notice and hearing. R. 
92. 
Big Water then brought a motion for summary judgment on the issue of 
proper notice and hearing in regards to the amended Big Water ordinance. R M I -
184. Specht filed a cross-motion for summary judj'.imMit \i \ c)4-2()0. Thr 
District Court, again, found in favor of Big Water and dismissed Specht's petition 
and complaint. R. 326-330. This appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Specht is a resident and ow nn ol property in Big Water. R. 18, 23. 
2. Big Water is a Utah municipal corporation. 
3. Rocky and Sheryl Pyle (the "Pyles") own three separate adjoining lots in 
Big Water all zoned for residential use. R. 18, 23. 
4. On one of the lots the Pyles have constructed a 2,000 square foot "garage." 
R. 4, 18, 157. A letter in the record written by a Big Water attorney states that Mr. 
Pyle estimated that the "garage" is over 200 square feet smaller than the Pyles' 
residence which is on another of the three lots. R. 49. A copy of the letter is 
included in the Addendum as Exhibit "A." 
5. Chapter 7a-2-5 of the Big Water Ordinance refers to a "garage" as an 
accessory use. See Addendum, Exhibit "B." 
6. The Big Water Building Inspector attempted to stop the Pyle's "garage" 
construction because there was no building permit. R. 4. Specht alleged that the 
Building Inspector was told by Big Water's Mayor that he would be fired if he 
stopped the construction. R. 313. 
7. Specht asserted that upon learning that the Building Inspector was 
threatened, Specht contacted the State of Utah and was referred to O.J. Peck, 
Department of Licensing. R. 313. 
8. Specht alleged that after this phone call, Peck contacted the Building 
Inspector and informed him that his license would be pulled unless he "red 
tagged" the construction immediately. R. 313. 
9. According to Specht, Peck traveled to Big Water and with the Building 
Inspector immediately issued a "red tag" stopping work on the Pyle's "garage" for 
not having a building permit. R. 313. While Mr. Peck was in Big Water he cited 
another construction project for having no building permit (Big Water 
acknowledged this fad) U l\\ :i,M. 
10. A couple days after the "red tag" was issued and the "garage" was nearly 
completed, Mr. Pyle applied for a building permit. R 4, 67 A copy of the 
building permit is included in the Addendum and marked as Exhibit "C." 
11. ' A da \' 1111 e i B i JJ W a 1e r received the Pyles' building permit application 
(March 4, 2003), an Agenda for a Board of Adjustment ("Board") meeting was 
posted but not published in a newspaper. 1< he meeting was scheduled for 
March 5,2005, the day after the J; iv 11/, see Addendum, 
Exhibit "D" which is a copy of the notice. The Agenda noted stated the following: 
1 .Call to Order 
2. Roll Call 
3. To hear and decide on the decisioi i of Building Inspector 
regarding interpretation. 
4. Adjournment. 
R. 117. 
12. This special meeting of the Board was called by the Mayor of Big Water. 
R. 312, 323. This was the first time (lie Board ever held a meeting at I p.m. R. 
312,323. 
13. The minutes of the Board hearing, included in the Addendum as Exhibit 
"E," note in pertinent part: 
3. I o hear and decide on the decision of Building 
Inspector regarding interpretation 
- Building Inspector John Altheide does not want to 
sign off on a Garage being built located [sic] RE-1 
Zone at 528 Freedom Way due to garage allegedly not 
meeting set back requirement in rear. The board is 
made aware of the site having had 3 inspections. Mr. 
Pyle informs the board that all inspections have been 
verbal[sic] and he was told by inspector to continue. 
Pyle was asked when the foundation was poured, the 
inspector came out, and he said he would not sign, Mr. 
Pyle recounted the discussion [sic]. Pyle explains that 
nothing was ever mentioned to him that he was out of 
compliance until he was 80% done. It was brought to 
the board's attention that at the last Town Council 
meeting the inspectors report mentions the three 
inspections he had given to Pyle's property. The board 
finds that our zoning set backs are confusing and give 
conflicting regulations, causing each person who reads 
them to interpret them differently including the 
Building Inspector. It was also noted that 
administration has been issuing information with 
zoning requirements that do not reflect all setbacks in 
all zones. This was done to help make things clearer 
for the builder and was an honest mistake. Board of 
Adjustment does not find that the builder should be 
penalized for the Administration's mistakes of 
conflicting or confusing text in the zoning regulations. 
The board construes nothing requested in this 
discussion to be arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. 
Alexander makes a motion to overturn the Building 
Inspectors decision of Interpretation of Pyles set backs 
for garage. Eric Lassen seconds. 4 Ayes. 1 Absent. 
R. 116 (emphasis not noted). 
14. After the Board meeting, the Mayor of Big Water drafted a letter which 
stated in that the actions of the Board were taken under the terms of § 10-9-707, 
U.C.A. which is the statute governing variances. R. 113. This letter is included in 
the Addendum as Exhibit "F." 
15. The day after the Board meeting an Agenda for the Big Water Planning and 
Zoning Commission was posted but not published in a newspaper. R. 115. In 
pertinent part, the Agenda stated, "3. Recommendation to Town Council of Set 
Backs of Residential and Commercial." R. 114. This Agenda is included in the 
Addendum as Exhibit "G." 
16. The Big Water Planning and Zoning meeting minutes for the March 10, 
2003 (Addendum Exhibit "H") note in pertinent part: 
3. Recommendation to Town Council of Set Backs 
of Residential and Commercial. - skipped to come 
back to later. Discussed under #6 
* * * 
6. Separating accessory building regulations from 
Main building regulations in Zone Ordinances. 
Discussed clarification that Lassen typed up. Nothing 
was really changed, it was just separated out to make it 
clear. May recommended that the setbacks for 
accessory buildings meet fire code and not have a set 
measurement. Blair argued that that would cause too 
many problems if the buildings met fire code and were 
built on the property line. It would infringe on the 
neighbors property. 
• K. I II. 
17. Twenty days after Big Water received the Pyles' building permit 
application an Agenda was posted for a meeting of the Town Council set for 
March 25, 2003; this Agenda was not published in a newspaper U 1(H) A u>py 
of the Agenda is included in tl le \ddendum as Exhibit "I." "Amending Set 
Backs" was mentioned twice in the Agenda in small font within parenthesis. R. 
106. The Agenda contained 13 events, not including subparts. ^ 
18. The Big Water Town Council meeting minutes, included in the Addendum 
as Exhibit "J," reflect very little regarding "amending set backs." These minutes 
state in pertinent part: 
6. Public Hearing . . . Carol Addy requests 
information on the Amendments [(apparently of two 
ordinances in addition to the "set backs" ordinance)]. 
Lassen details Amendments of all Ordinances. 
16. New Business - .. .Ordinance 2006-216, 
(Amending set backs) parsons motions to approve 
Ord 2006-216, amended set backs. Hoover seconds. 
4 Ayes. 1 Absent. 
R. 104-105. 
19. Months after the above-referenced Town Council meeting, on November 
24, 2003, the Big Water attorney sent a letter to Specht's attorney. R. 48-49. This 
letter explained that the Town Council had amended the set-back ordinance at the 
March 25, 2003 meeting and therefore, the Pyles' garage was now in conformance 
all zoning codes. R. 49; see Addendum Exhibit "A." 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Board acted in an arbitrary, capricious, and illegal manner at the March 
4, 2003 hearing when it ignored the illegal acts of the Pyles and allowed them to 
continue constructing their 2,000 square foot garage. Second, the Big Water 
Town Council acted in an arbitrary, capricious, and illegal manner when, within 
twenty days of the Board hearing, the Council "amended" the zoning ordinance so 
as to make the Pyles' illegally constructed 2,000 square foot garage conform to the 
set-back requirements (but never made a stand-alone garage a permitted use as 
opposed to a accessory use). 
In granting summary judgment as to the first issue, the District Court 
overlooked the following undisputed facts which clearly demonstrate, as a matter 
of law, that the Board acted illegally: (1) Pyles never obtained a building permit 
until construction of their 2,000 square foot garage was 80% complete and the 
Building Inspector admonished them that they were out of compliance with the 
set-back ordinance; (2) the Mayor of Big Water called an emergency meeting of 
the Board (which was not properly noticed) a day after Big Water received the 
Pyles' building permit application; and, (3) the Board ignored the failure of the 
Pyles to obtain a building permit prior to construction, found the unambiguous set-
back ordinance "confusing," took no testimony from the Building Inspector and 
allowed the Pyles to proceed with construction. 
As for the second issue, the District Court did not consider that Big Water 
failed to give proper notice of the set-back ordinance and failed to keep sufficient 
minutes of those changes. Because of this lack of notice and failure to maintain 
proper minutes the citizens were not properly informed of the proposed change to 
the zoning ordinance and therefore could not comment on, negate or affirm those 
changes. 
Finally, because the 2,000 square foot garage was the only improvement on 
the lot and because a garage is an "accessory use" and therefore dependent on 
another structure as the "primary or permitted" use being present, it was an error 
for the District Court to rule in favor of Big Water on this issue. The District 
Court pointed to the Big Water ordinance definition of "lot" in supporting its 
ruling. However, the definition is confusing as it defines a "lot" as a "contiguous 
parcel of land" and "contiguous" is a term use to describe the relationship between 
more than one parcel of land. (The "definitions" section of the ordinance are 
included in the Addendum and marked as Exhibit "K.") 
When all of the individual facts involved in this case are added up it results 
in a reasonable conclusion that Big Water acted to benefit the Pyles and ignore 
their own ordinances and the law. 
ARGUMENT 
Although an appellate court reviews the entry of summary judgment for 
correctness, according no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions, review of 
a municipality's land use decision is limited to determining whether the decision 
was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. Wads worth Construction, Inc. v West Jordan 
City. 2000 UT App 49, ^9, 999 P.2d 1240. When an appellate court reviews a 
municipality's land use decision it presumes the regulations and decision are valid. 
Gardner v. Perry City, 2000 UT App 1, H 8, 994, P.2d 811, 813. 
A quasi-judicial or administrative determination, such as the one made by 
the Iron County land use authorities in this case, is valid only if supported by 
substantial evidence. See Wadsworth Constr. V. West Jordan City, 2004 UT App 
49,1J9 ("A municipality's land use decision [concerning the granting or denial of a 
condition use permit] is arbitrary and capricious [only] if it is not supported by 
substantial evidence.")(citing Springville Citizens v. Springville, 1999 UT 25,1f24, 
979 P.2d 332). Substantial evidence is defined as "that quantum and quality of 
relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a 
conclusion." Bradley v. Pavson, 2003 UT 16, Tf 14. In applying this standard, a 
court may compare the determinations made by the land use authority with 
evidence and decide if the decision was supported by the evidence. Uintah 
Mountains v. Duchesne County, 2005 UT App 565, ffi[19-36. 
L THE ACTIONS AND/OR DECISION OF THE BIG WATER BOARD OF 
ADJUSTMENT WERE ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND/OR ILLEGAL. 
Municipal zoning authorities are bound by the terms and standards of 
applicable zoning ordinances and are not at liberty to make land use decisions in 
derogation thereof. Springville Citizens v. City of Springville, 1999 UT25, ^30, 
979 P.2d 332. A municipality cannot "change the rules halfway through the 
game." Id (citations omitted). If a municipality does not properly comply with its 
own zoning ordinances that municipality's land use decision is illegal. Id. While, 
a municipality can amend their zoning ordinances the determination of zoning 
policy is properly vested in the legislative branch and cannot be delegated to a 
quasi-judicial body such as a board of adjustment. Bradley v. Payson, 2006 UT 
16, Tfl3, 70 P.3d 47 (citing Sandy City. 827 P.2d at 221 (Utah App. Ct. 1992)). 
"Policy" is defined as "a principle, plan, or course of action, as pursued by a 
government...." Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language, 
1102, (2nd College ed. 1978). 
Boards of adjustment cannot merely pick and choose as to the persons 
whom they will or will not require strict compliance with a land use ordinance. 
Walton v. Tracv Loan, 92 P.2d 724, 728 (Utah 1939). Boards of adjustment can 
tailor a zoning or rezoning ordinance to specific, unforeseen circumstances, but 
they lack the authority to determine zoning classifications of their own accord. 
Sandy Citv v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 212, 220 (Utah 1992). While Board of 
Adjustments may grant a variance pursuant to § 10-9a-702 (formerly §10-9-707), 
this statute vest no discretion in the Board to grant variances for any reasons other 
than those enumerated in the statute. Wells v. Board of Adjustment, 936 P.2d 
1102, 1104-1105, (Utah App. Ct. 1997). 
A. The Board arbitrarily, capriciously and/or illegally ignored the obvious fact that 
the Pyles began construction prior to obtaining a building permit and ignored the 
building inspector's declaration that the Pyles were out of compliance. 
Although the minutes of the Board of Adjustment are in a sorry state they 
still reveal arbitrary, capricious and illegal actions of the Board. Specifically, the 
Board ignored the Pyles' failure to obtain a building permit until a few days prior 
to the Board's meeting. R. 4, 67. Additionally, the Board overlooked the failure 
of the Pyles to comply with the relevant ordinances after the building inspector 
notified them of their noncompliance. R. 4. 
The March 5, 2003 Board minutes (Addendum Exhibit "E") state in 
pertinent part: 
The board is made aware of the site having had 3 
inspections. 
Pyle was asked when the foundation was poured, the 
inspector came out, and he said he would not sign, Mr. 
Pyle recounted the discussion. 
*** 
It was brought to the board's attention that at the last 
Town Council meeting the inspector report mentions 
the three inspections he had given to Pyle's property. 
R.4. 
These minutes reveal that the Building Inspector made three visits to the 
Pyle's property. When Pyle poured the foundation for his structure, the Building 
Inspector told him he was out of compliance. The Pyle's obtained a building 
permit for the structure five days prior to the Board's hearing. R. 67, 4. Pyle was 
at least "80% done" with the building of his structure prior to the Board's hearing. 
R. 4. Big Water will not refute the fact that a building permit is required by their 
ordinances to proceed with construction. Hence, the Board's own minutes reveal 
the Pyles' violations and the refusal of the Board to enforce Big Water's own 
ordinances. 
The irony of the Big Water's position on appeal is readily apparent: Big 
Water, through its Board of Adjustment, ignored ordinances it has legislatively 
deemed to be mandatory.1 Therefore, the Board's action was arbitrary, capricious 
and/or illegal. Id. 
1
 This statement is almost an exact quote of the statement made by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Springville: The irony of the City's position on appeal is readily 
apparent: the City contends that it need only "substantially comply" with 
ordinances it has legislatively deemed to be mandatory. 1999 UT 25, \ 30. 
B. The Board of Adjustment acted in an arbitrary, capricious and/or illegal 
manner when it ignored the clear and unambiguous Big Water Ordinance 
concerning set-backs. 
The set back ordinance in this case reads: 
Minimum Setback Requirements for any Accessory 
Buildings: 
Front Yard = 30' from the edge of the road and the 
utility easement 
Rear Yard =10' 
Side Yard =10 ' 
R. 137, Big Water Ordinance 7a-4. 
As a matter of law, the setback requirement was clear and unambiguous. 
However, the Board found "that the builder should not be penalized for the 
Administration's mistake of conflicting or confusing text in the zoning 
regulations." R. 4; see Addendum Exhibit "E." The Board made a change in 
zoning policy for the benefit of the Pyles and therefore exceeded it authority. 
Bradley. 2006 UT 16^13. 
The Board never employed the terms "variance" or "exception to 
circumvent some unjust hardship in [the ordinance's] application." See Sandy 
City, 827 P.2d at 220. The Board's decision did not "provide important elasticity 
in the application of zoning ordinances to avoid arbitrary or confiscatory 
consequences at odds with the zoning's general purpose and intent." Id. 
Ultimately, the Board's intent as manifested by its actions was to ignore 
Big Water ordinances for the exclusive benefit of the Pyles. For this reason, this 
Court should find the actions of the Board were arbitrary, capricious, and/or 
illegal. 
C. Despite the Mayor's open letter stating that the Board granted a variance, the 
Board did not, among other things, make the necessary findings to grant a 
variance. 
Apparently, the Mayor recognized that the minutes of the Board were 
insufficient and he therefore supplemented the record with an open letter shortly 
after the Board hearing. This letter stated, inter alia, that: 
The Board voted to overturn the decision of the 
Building Official. Under the terms of UCA 10-9-707 
[i.e.9 the variance ordinance,] upon Ms. Alexander's 
motion, [sic] 
R. 113; see Addendum Exhibit "F." 
However, the statement by the Mayor is, as a matter of law, incorrect. In 
order for a Board of Adjustment to grant a variance they must make the required 
statutory findings; they cannot grant a variance for any other reason. See Wells v. 
Board of Adjustment 936 P.2d 1102, 1104-1105, (Utah App. Ct. 1997); and, 
Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment, 685 P.2d 1032, 1035-1036 (Utah 1984). In this 
case the Board did not make any of the required findings. Even assuming that the 
Board did make the required statutory findings it cannot pick and choose who it 
will or will not grant a variance. .See Walton v. Tracy Loan, 92 P.2d 724, 728 
(Utah 1939) (citation omitted). 
D. The Board failed to give proper notice of its hearing and keep accurate 
minutes. 
All meetings of the board of adjustment must comply with the requirements 
of Title 52, Chapter 4, Open and Public Meetings Act. § 10-9-702(4)(a),£/.CA 
(2003). The Open and Public Meetings Act requires 24 hours public notice of the 
agenda. § 52-4-6 (2), U.CA. (2003). Additionally, public notice must be given by 
posting written notice and publishing the notice in at least one newspaper of 
general circulation. § 52-4-6 (3), U.CA. (2003). 
The Open and Public Meetings Act requires that written minutes or tape 
recordings must be kept of all open meetings. § 52-4-7 (1), U.CA. (2003). These 
minutes or tape recordings must include: 
(a) the date, time and place of the meeting; 
(b) the names of members present and absent; 
(c) the substance of all matters proposed, discussed, or decided, and a 
record, by individual member, of votes taken; 
(d) the names of all citizens who appeared and the substance in brief of 
their testimony; and 
(e) any other information that any member requests be entered into the 
minutes. 
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In this case, Big Water failed to give public notice of the Board's hearing to 
a newspaper of general circulation. Additionally, it is impossible to determine 
whether the notice was posted 24 hours prior to the hearing because the town clerk 
merely certified that posting occurred the day prior to the meeting. 
This is especially important considering that this was the first time the 
Board ever held a meeting at 1:00 p.m. R. 312, \ 24; R. 323, If 24. The lack of 
notification is especially suspicious considering that the Big Water Mayor called 
the meeting of the Board the day the Pyles applied for a building permit. R. 312, \ 
21; 323421 . 
The minutes indicate that the Board found the "zoning set backs confusing 
and give conflicting regulations, causing each person who reads them to interpret 
them differently including the Building Inspector." R. 4. However, the minutes 
reveal no basis for the Board to make that decision. R. 4. The "confusing" 
ordinance was not identified much less read into the record; the "conflicting 
regulations" were not identified or read into the record. R. 4. 
Significantly, the Building Inspector was not present at the Board meeting 
and therefore was not afforded an opportunity to establish the basis of his 
interpretation. The only person who spoke at the meeting was Mr. Pyle, who the 
minutes clearly reveal failed to obtain a building permit and ignored the 
admonishments of the Building Inspector. 
The minutes do not reveal if the purpose of the meeting was to hear an 
appeal, grant a special exception or allow a variance. See § 10-9-703, U.C.A. 
(2003). ; R. 4. The minutes contain no mention of whom or what prompted the 
meeting. R. 4; see Addendum Exhibit "E." 
E. The District Court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Big Water. 
In granting summary judgment regarding the propriety of the Board's 
actions the District Court found in a succinct Memorandum Decision that there 
2
 Section 10-9-703, U.C.A. (2003) reads in full: 
(1) The board of adjustment shall hear and decide: 
(a) appeals from zoning decisions applying the zoning ordinance; 
(b) special exceptions to the terms of the zoning ordinance; and 
(c) variances from the terms of the zoning ordinance. 
(2) The board of adjustment may make determinations regarding the 
existence, expansion, or modification of nonconforming uses if that authority is 
delegated to them by the legislative body. 
was a building permit and the setback was in harmony with the amended 
ordinance. R. 93. In reaching this decision the District Court erred in not fully 
considering the above-referenced arguments. 
II. BIG WATER DID NOT PROPERLY AMENDED ITS SET-BACK 
ORDINANCE WHERE IT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE NOTICE 
PROVISIONS OF EITHER LUDMA OR THE OPEN MEETINGS ACT. 
Utah law grants citizens the right to be informed of the current and 
proposed permitted uses of land and governmental action in that regard. CAN v. 
Marakis, 873 P.2d 1117, 1121 (Utah 1994). Citizens cannot take advantages of 
these rights if they are not aware of the activities of their elected representatives. 
Id. The 2003 Municipal Land Use Development and Management Act §§ 10-9-
403 and 402, U.C.A., required Big Water to provide 14 days notice before a 
hearing on amending a zoning ordinance. Section 10-9-103(2)(a) requires notice 
via written postings and publication in a newspaper. The planning commission is 
to prepare and recommend a proposed ordinance to the town council. § 10-9-402, 
U.C.A. (2003). 
Planning Commission 
In the present case, the Board of Adjustment held its meeting on March 5, 
2003. R. 118. The next day, March 6, 2003, notice was posted for a March 10, 
2003 P&Z hearing which stated, "Recommendation to Town Council of Set Backs 
of Residential and Commercial." R. 114; see Addendum Exhibit "G." Notice was 
not published in a newspaper. The relevant minutes for this meeting are as 
follows: 
3. Recommendation to Town Council of Set Backs 
of Residential and Commercial. - skipped to come 
back to later. Discussed under #6 
*** 
6. Separating accessory building regulations from 
Main building regulations in Zone Ordinances. 
Discussed clarification that Lassen typed up. Nothing 
was really changed, it was just separated out to make it 
clear. May recommended that the setbacks for 
accessory buildings meet fire code and not have a set 
measurement. Blair argued that that would cause too 
many problems if the buildings met fire code and were 
built on the property line. It would infringe on the 
neighbors property. 
R. 111 (emphasis added); see Addendum Exhibit "H." 
As a matter of law, the actions by the Big Water P&Z are inadequate. First, 
the notice itself was inadequate and would not put a citizen on notice of a 
proposed amendment to the zoning ordinance; fourteen days notice was not 
provided; and, the notice was not published in a newspaper. Second, no proposed 
ordinance was prepared to be presented to the Town Council. In fact, the minutes 
reveal that "nothing was really changed" which supports the argument that the 
actions of Big Water were simply to bend the rules for the benefit of the Pyles. 
See Addendum Exhibit "A," ]f6. 
Town Council 
Twenty days after Big Water received the Pyles' building permit an 
Agenda was posted for a meeting of the Town Council set for March 25, 2003; 
this Agenda was not published in a newspaper. R. 106. "Amending Set Backs" 
was mentioned twice in the Agenda in small font within parenthesis. R. 106. The 
Agenda contained 13 events, not including subparts. R. 106; see Addendum 
Exhibit "I." 
The Big Water Town Council meeting minutes reflect very little regarding 
"amending set backs." These minutes state in pertinent part: 
6. Public Hearing . . . Carol Addy requests 
information on the Amendments [(apparently of two 
ordinances in addition to the "set backs" ordinance)]. 
Lassen details Amendments of all Ordinances. 
16. New Business - . . .Ordinance 2006-216, 
(Amending set backs) parsons motions to approve 
Ord 2006-216, amended set backs. Hoover seconds. 
4 Ayes. 1 Absent. 
R. 104-105; see Addendum Exhibit "J." 
The actions of the Town Council as a matter of law are inadequate. Notice 
was not published in a newspaper and the posting referred to amending the zoning 
ordinance in a parenthetical in small font. R. 106. The minutes fail to reveal 
exactly what was discussed or even how the set-back ordinance was changed. 
In granting summary judgment for Big Water the District Court found that 
these postings complied with §10-9a-205(3), U.C.A. (2005). R. 338. However, 
this statute was not in existence in 2003, the year the relevant happenings 
occurred; additionally, §10-9a-205(3), U.CA. (2005) unlike §10-9-103(2)(a), 
U.C.A. (2003) the relevant statutes in effect at the time of the meetings, does not 
require a municipality to publish notice in a newspaper. 
III. THE 2,000 SQUARE FOOT GARAGE IS NOT AN ACCESSORY USE 
TO THE PLYES' RESIDENCE AS IT IS LOCATED ON A SEPARATE 
LOT AND IS CLEARLY IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE RESIDENTIAL 
CHARACTER OF THE ZONE. 
The ascertainment of what constitutes an accessory use customarily 
incidental to a single-family dwelling is a question of law. Town of Alta v. Ben 
Hame, 836 P.2d 797, 800 (Utah Ct. App 1992). However, a reviewing court 
should afford some level of non-binding deference to the interpretation advanced 
by the local agency. Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98, ^ f28 (citations 
omitted). 
The Big Water Ordinance does not define "accessory use." See Addendum 
Exhibit "K." When a statute does not define a word, Utah courts rely on the 
dictionary to determine the "usual meaning." Hercules v. Utah State Tax Comm., 
2000 UT App 372, f 9. An "accessory use" is "[a] use which is subordinate to, 
clearly incidental to, customary in connection with, and ordinarily located on the 
same lot with [the]principal use." Black's Law Dictionary 15 (6th ed. 
1990)(emphasis added). 
In the present case, it is undisputed that the "garage" and Pyles' residence 
are on different lots. R. 49, 54, 75, 93.3 Hence, the 2,000 square foot "garage" is 
not a valid accessory use. 
3
 The Big Water Ordinance defines a "lot" as, "[a] parcel of contiguous 
land . . ." See Addendum, Exhibit "K." However, the term "contiguous" is 
typically used to describe two or more lots as being in contact with each other. 
Hence, the inclusion of the term "contiguous" in Big Water's definition of a single 
lot is confusing. 
Additionally, "[w]hile the necessity for permitting accessory use must be 
admitted, the objectives of the comprehensive plan will be jeopardized if 
accessory use is so broadly construed as to allow incompatible uses to invade a 
residential district." Kenneth H. Young, Anderson's American Law of Zoning 
§9.28, p. 198 (4th ed. 1996)(included in the addendum and marked as Exhibit "L"). 
In this case, the 2,000 square foot stand alone garage on a separate lot clearly is 
invading the residential zone in which it is located. This structure is not 
subordinate to, clearly incidental to, or customary in connection with a single 
family residence. It therefore follows that the 2,000 square foot garage is in 
violation of the Big Water zoning ordinance. 
CONCLUSION 
The Board violated the Municipal Land Use Development and 
Management Act, as well as Big Water ordinances, when it (1) ignored the failure 
of the Pyles to properly obtain a building permit, (2) ignored the set-back 
ordinance, and (3) failed to give proper notice and keep accurate minutes. 
Big Water's "amendment" of the set-back ordinance also violated the 
Municipal Land Use Development and Management Act by failing to properly 
notice the proposed amendment to the set-back ordinance. Additionally, Big 
Water never properly drafted a proposed ordinance. These failures ultimately 
resulted in the public being informed of the current and proposed permitted uses of 
land and governmental action in that regard. Finally, the 2,000 square foot garage 
is clearly not an "accessory use" because no "primary or permitted use" is on the 
same lot; also, the garage is contrary to the residential character of the zone. 
For these compelling reasons, the lower court's orders granting Big Water 
summary judgment should be set aside and reversed. 
DATED this JLV^ day of January, 2007. 
HUTCHINGS BAIRD & CURTIS & ASTILL 
P.L.L.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Bruce R. baird 
Walter T. Keane 
r\ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the I* day of January, 2007 I mailed, by First Class 
United States Mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS to the following: 
J. Robert Latham #6915 
CRAMER & CRAMER, LLC 
845 South Main St. #23 
Bountiful, Utah 
i\ 
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November 24, 2003 
Bruce R. Baird, Esq. 
Baird & Jones 
299 South Main Street, #1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: Specht vs. Big Water 
Dear Bruce: 
While I was in Big Water last week, I spoke to Rocky and Sheryl Pyle at 
their house. I asked to see the garage along with the rest of the property. The 
garage is a beautiful well constructed building and is an asset to any community. 
They use it to store their vehicles and other items. I did see several bags of dog 
food on some shelves. Evidently, they own four purebred dogs that are members 
of their family. The dog food is an expensive brand that can only be purchased in 
Phoenix, and they buy several bags at one time. Mrs. Pyle said that she works for 
the school district, and had sent an e-mail to people asking if they wanted to join a 
cooperative to purchase the dog food and save time and money. She stated that 
she had no response to her inquiry and later confirmed that she withdrew her 
application for the conditional use permit. (That request is dated February 28, 
2003.) The Pyle's assured me that the dog food I noticed is not for sale and is 
only for their dogs. 
The Pyle's consider that their three lots are combined. Mr. Pyle stated that 
the house is over 200 square feet larger than the garage. While there, I went to 
the back of the garage and measured the distance from the garage to the property 
line. I found the distance to be about 13 feet. This distance is over the 10 feet 
required as the minimum setback for accessory buildings. I believe in a previous 
conversation with you I mentioned that the ordinance was amended. The Town 
Council took that action on March 25, 2003. 
Bruce R. Baird, Esq 
November 24, 2003 
While at the Pyle's I didn't notice any heavy equipment. They do have 
recreational vehicles such as ATV's and motor homes on the property. One 
would expect to see such items in that part of the state. 
I've enclosed a few copies of relevant documents. I hope we can resolve 
this matter. As always, I appreciate your professionalism, and look forward to 
hearing from you. Best wishes for a happy Thanksgiving. 
Sincerely, 
Alan K. Thompson 
Town Attorney 
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Chapter 7a 
RE-l, Residential Estates Zones 
7a-l Purpose 
To provide for residential estate neighborhoods of a rural character together with a limited number of 
livestock for the benefit and enjoyment of the residents of the neighborhood. 
7a-2 Permitted Uses 
1) The raising of crops, horticulture and gardening 
2) The keeping of livestock except that the following shall apply: 
a) All livestock shall be kept in such a way as not to disturb the peace, comfort or health and 
safety of any person or animal. 
b) All pens, stalls, stables, yards, shelters, cages, areas, places and premises where livestock are 
held or kept, shall be maintained so that flies, insects, or vermin, rodent harborage, odors, 
ponded water, the accumulation of manure, garbage or other noxious materials do not disturb 
the peace, comfort or health of any person or animal. 
c) It is prohibited for any person to keep or shelter any livestock within 100 feet of a building 
used for human habitation, other than their own. 
d) Pigs shall be permitted with the following limitation: No pigsty or piggery shall be built or 
maintained on marshy ground or land subject to overflow, nor within 200 feet of any stream, 
canal or other source of water supply, nor within 300 feet of an inhabited house or occupied 
building on an adjoining property. 
e) On lots one-half acre or more, no more than two animals and 10 fowl shall be permitted. 
f) On lots one acre or more, no more than four animals and 10 fowl shall be permitted. 
g) On lots one and one-half acres or more, no more than six animals and 10 fowl shall be 
permitted. 
h) On lots two acres or more, no more than eight animals and 10 fowl shall be permitted, 
i) No livestock shall be raised for commercial purposes but shall be for family use only. 
3) Household pets and kennels. 
a) All household pets must be kept in such a way that they do not disturb the peace, comfort, or 
health of any person or animal. 
b) Yards, shelters, cages, areas, places and premises where they are kept shall be maintained so 
that flies, odors, the accumulation of manure or other noxious materials do not disturb the 
peace, comfort or health of any person or animal. 
c) All waste must be disposed of in a proper manner. 
4) Single family dwellings including new prefabricated, modular, and mobile homes which conform 
to the following conditions: 
a) Conform to all applicable codes, ordinances and regulations and have the minimum floor 
square footage of the particular zone and ratio of length footprint to the width footprint of not 
more than four (4). 
b) Placed on permanent foundation: Modular and prefabricated housing will be set on 
conventional-type foundations, as recommended by Manufactured Housing Regulations 
meeting UBC requirements. Manufactured and modular homes will be set on an approved 
foundation and must have a cosmetic perimeter wall to give the visual effect of a permanent 
conventional foundation. 
5) Accessory buildings and uses. 
a) No accessory building shall be erected to a height greater than 16.5 feet. 
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b) No metal skinned building, whether prefabricated or constructed on site, shail be erected with 
a total floor area greater than 300 square feet. This is not intended to prohibit the installation 
or use of metal siding, which gives the outward appearance of clapboard, or other wood 
siding. 
c) No garage or accessory building shall be erected with a total floor area greater than the 
residence to which it is accessory. 
d) No permit for the construction of a garage or accessory building shall be issued unless a 
permit for the construction of the associated main dwelling has been issued or is being issued 
simultaneously or a legally existing main dwelling already exists. 
e) In the event a property owner has obtained a permit for the construction of a main dwelling as 
required above and elects to construct the accessory building first, the time limit to commence 
construction of the main dwelling shall be extended from 180 days, as specified in the 1997 
Uniform Building Code, to 365 days without penalty. There after, upon written application 
by the permit holder, the Town Council may extend the time limit based on recommendation 
by the Planning and Zoning Commission for a period not to exceed one year. 
6) All uses permitted in the R-l Zone. 
7a-3 Conditional Uses 
1) Church 
2) School 
3) Park and Playground 
4) Public Utilities 
5) Public Buildings 
6) Golf Courses 
7) Additional animals may be approved by die Planning and Zoning Commission, on lots larger than 
three acres. 
8) Kennels 
a) Must meet all State, County and Municipal Ordinances. 
b) All kennels are to be kept in such a way as to not disturb the peace, comfort or health and 
safety of any person or animal. 
c) All pens, yards, shelters, cages, areas, and premises where animals are held or kept shall be 
maintained so that flies, insects, or vermin, rodent harborage, odors, ponded water, the 
accumulation of manure, garbage or other noxious materials do not disturb the peace, comfort 
or health and safety of any person or animal. 
d) It is prohibited for any person to keep or shelter any animal within 100 feet of a building used 
for human habitation, other than their own. — 
e) Must on an individual basis meet conditions set forth by Planning and Zoning. 
9) Exotic Animals 
a) Must be kept in compliance with all State, County, and Municipal Ordinances and 
Regulations. 
b) All such animals shall be safely penned or caged so that they do not endanger the health and 
safety of any person or animal. 
c) All pens, stalls, stables, yards, shelters, cages, areas, and premises where animals are held or 
kept shall be maintained so that flies, insects, or vermin, rodent harborage, odors, ponded 
water, the accumulation of manure, garbage or other noxious materials do not disturb the 
peace, comfort or health and safety of any person or animal. 
d) No person shall keep or maintain poisonous reptiles, or dangerous or carnivorous wild 
animals without having registered such animal or reptile with the state and county Humane 
Officers. 
e) It is prohibited for any person to keep or shelter any animal within 100 feet of a building used 
for human habitation, other than their own. 
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BIG WATER MUNICIPAL CORPORATION 
BUllDING PERMIT APPLICATION 
Becomes permit when approved and signed by Building Inspector 
ALL NUMBERED ITEMS TO BE FILLED IN BY APPLICANT 
(l)DATE RECEIPT NO DATE ISSUED 
(2) PROPOSED US* OF STRUCTURE 
PERMIT NUMBER 
(J) BUILDING ADDRESS 
-5" 
(nrwdcJ(_j 
9V FrzeCoM tAhuU 
______ _ _ 
ASSESSORS PARCEL NUMBER - ~ 
(5) L O T * 
_ 
(6) BLOCK (7) SUBDIVISION NAME " 
(S) PROPERTY LOCATION- . .
 A 
(5) TOTAL PROPERTY AREA IN SQ FT 1(10) TOTAL SQ FT aFSTRUCTURE(S) 
(17) ARCHITECT OR ENGINEER 
(19) GENERAL CONTRACTOR 
(18) PHONE 
(20) PHONE 
(21) BUSINESS ADDRESS (22) UTAH LIC NO 
(23) ELECTRICAL CONTRACTOR 
(25) BUSINESS ADDRESS 
(24) PHONE 
(24) UTAH LIC NO 
BUILDING FEE SCHEDULE 
(40) SQUARE FT OF BUILDING 
(41) ROUGH B A S E M E N T 
(42) FINI5r i__rB*ASEMEiNTn 
VALUATION 
J3& too 
/S3.3. /5l 
(44) GARACE SQ.FT. 
^ ? _ > 0 
OTHER 
TYPE OF BUILDING 
6UtjL &Sho% 
OCCUPANCY GROUP 
_ _ _ _ . 
FIRESPRXNKLERS REQ Qm B _ 0 
(3ECI FOX GUDING PERMIT ONLY Q 
MAXIMUM OCCUPANT LOAD 
(44) ZONE. /-£-/ 
COMMENTS 
PLAN CHECK OK BY 
SPECIAL APPROVALS 
(27) PLUMBING CONTRACTOR 
(29) BUSINESS ADDRESS 
(23) PHONE CONDITIONAL USE 
HEALTH DEPT 
(30) UTAH U C NO 
FIRE DEPT 
KGWA'Ibh (31) MECHANICAL CONTRACTOR 
(31) BUSINESS ADDRESS 
(32) PHONE SOIL REPORT 
WATER OR WELL PERMIT 
(34) UTAH LIC NO. 
(35) PREVIOUS USE OF LAND OR STRUCTURE 
B_XLi_ 
fr 
ELECTRICAL DEPT 
(3«) DWELLING UNITS NOW ON LOT 
2 FLOOD CONTROL 
(37) ACCESSORY BUTL^ DINCS NOW ON LOT SEWER OR SEPTIC 
ENGINEER 
(38) TYPE OF IMPROVEMENT OR CONSTRUCTION 
O 3IGN S3 BUILD L J REMODEL L J ADDITION 
P I REPAIR L _ MOVE f"~l CONVERT USE f] DEMOLISH 
OTHER 
OTHER 
JL 2_ 
(4S) SETBACKS IN FEET 
FROVT 
Igftlfr jSHfrE.. 
(39) TYPE OF CONSTRUCTION 
• FRAME Q BRICK • STEEL 
• eeict: vr? Tjfl BLOCK 
• COKRITI n OTHER 
BOND REQUIRED Q YES ^ h N O 
(LIST) This permit become* null and void if work or 
construction authorized is not commenced 
wilhta 180 days, or If construction is suspended or abandoned Tor a period on ISO days at 
any time after work is commenced I hexeby certify that I have read and examined this 
application and know,the umc (o be trai and correct All provtsioos of laws and ordinances 
governing tbb typt ol\wo\kwlU be complied withWicthcr specified herein or not The granting 
oT a permit does not g^\ve.i^_iorityyttrYidhte an/T&tjite or local law, ordinance, or regulation. 
I hereby ccrt-yjLhatUntakc thfac stAemfcrisyUftdcr penalty of penury ^ >~ ^ 
j/*/o3 
\A 
Exhibit D 
AGENDA 
Board of Adjustments 
Town Hall 
March 5, 2003-12:00 
12:00 P.M. 
1. Call to Order 
2. Roll Call 
j . hear and decide on the decision of Building 
Inspector regarding interpretation. 
4. Adjournment. 
March 4, 2003 
Exhibit b 
1 
Board of Adjustment Minutes 
March 5, 2003 
12:00 P.M. 
Meeting 
1. Jennie Lassen called the Board of Adjustment meeting to order at 12:04 p.m. 
2. Roll Cal l - Attending: Vicki Alexander, IV• ' Jar-; '. icL - -.c Lassen and Jennie 
Lassen. Absent: Diana Joseph. 
Citizen present: Rocky Pyle, Bill May, JOAIH and Mrs. Ruybel, Betty 
Olson, Bo Joseph and Mayor Willy Marshall. 
3. To hear and decide on the decision of Building Inspector regarding interpretation 
- Building Inspector John Altheide does not want to sign off on a Garage being built 
located RE-1 Zone at 528 Freedom Way due to garage allegedly not meeting set back 
requirement in rear. The board is made aware of the site having had 3 inspections. Mr. 
Pyle informs the board that all inspections have been verbal and he was told by mspector 
to continue. Pyle was asked when the foundation was poured, the inspector came out, and 
he said he would not sign, Mr. Pyle recounted the discussion. Pyle explains that nothing 
was ever mentioned to him that he was out of compliance until he was 80% done. It was 
brought to the board's attention that at the last Town Council meeting the inspectors 
report mentions the three inspections he had given to Pyle's property. The board finds 
that our zoning set backs are confusing and give conflicting regulations, causing each 
person who reads them to interpret them differently including the Building Inspector. It 
was also noted that administration has been issuing information with zoning requirements 
that do not reflect all setbacks in all zones. This was done to help make things clearer for 
the builder and was an honest mistake. Board of Adjustments does not find that the 
builder should be penalized for the Administration's mistake of conflicting or confusing 
text in the zoning regulations. The board construes nothing requested in this discussion to 
be arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. Alexander makes a motion to overturn the Building 
Inspectors decision of Interpretation of Pyles set backs for garage. Eric Lassen 
seconds. 4 Ayes. 1 Absent. 
4. Adjournment - 12:30 p.m. 
Approved by Town: 
Jennie Lassen, Chairperson Date 
0 3-1Z-43 
Gail Spoto, T6wn Clerk Date 
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/:. * may concern, 
The Board of Adjus tments held a meeting Wednesday March 5} 2 0 0 3 . The Board 
determined that the set back requirements in the Town planning and zoning ordinances 
are v ag tie, anibiguous, and confusing, It fi irther detei mined that to den] • Us Ir. P; "'"le's 
request would be both arbitrary and capricious. The Board voted to overturn,, the 
decision of the Building Official. I Jndei the tei ms • : f ( IC A 10 9 707 up :)ii IV is, 
Alexander's motion. The official vote was 4 ayes and one member absent. The Board 
found that there were no harmful affects associated \\ ith this decision and did not 
choose to impose any additional requirements for the purpose of mitigation. 
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Exhibit G 
AGENDA 
Bit Water Municipal Corporation 
Planning and Zoning Meeting 
v Session 7:00 p.m. & Meeting 8:00 p.m. 
March 10, 2003 
Work Session 7:00 p.m. 
1. Call to Ordei 
2. Roll Call 
3. Recommendation to Town Council of Set Backs of Residential and 
Commercial. 
4. Amending Chapter 25 (Sign Ordinance 25 1) 
5. Amending Chapter 16, (To reflect State of Utah's newest adopted Building 
Code.) 
6. Separating accessory building regulations Iron milding 
regulations in Zone Ordinances. 
7. Amending Zoning ordinances to refle* >it» i uili 
8. Adopting the Fire Code. 
9. Adjourned, 
Meeting 8:00 P.M. 
1. Call to Order 
2. Roll Call 
3. Approval of Minutes 
a. February 10, 2003 
4. Citizen Comment 
5. New Business 
a. Amending Chapter 25 (Sign Ordinance 25-1) (Action) 
mending Zoning Ordinance to reflect International Build": 
c. Adopting Fire Code. 
d. Separating accessory building regulations from main building regulations in 
zoning Ordinances. 
6. Old Business 
a. Recommendation forwarded to Town Council ol <vt Hul « ( K^sidt uliiil .in I 
Commercial. (Action) 
b. Amending Chapter 16, (To reflect State of Utah's newest adopted Building 
Code) (Action) 
7. Final Comment 
8. Adjournment. 
Exhibit H 
MINUTES 
Big Water Municipal Corpoi s t I: h : in 
Planning and Zoning Meeting 
Work Session 7:00 p.m. & Meeting 8:00 j: i ., i 
March 10, 2003 
W ork Session 1 :00 p.m. 
1. Blair called to order at /. iu p.m. 
2. Roll Call - Attending Hash, May, Lassen, Wadleigh, and Blair. 
3. Recommendation to Town Council of Set Backs of Residential and 
Commercial. - skipped to come back to later. Discussed -under #6 
4 Amending Chapter 25 (Sign Ordinance 25 V- iiscussed amending 
to allow SITLA to put up signs for their subdivision. Need to allow for 
property signs in residential up to 8x8 as conditional use. Need to strike 
identification signs, not needed. Need to decrease the size of the 
information signs. 
5. Amending Chapter 16, (To reflect State of Utah's newest adopted Building 
Code.) Also need to say sheds less than 200 sq ft with no plumbing or electrical and 
fences 6 ft or less, do not need a permit. Also need to say that 2 P&Z members will sign 
off on a permit instead of one. And maybe we need to add a time limit of 30 days for the 
building inspector to sign off on it or give reason why it cannot be signed, 
6. Separating accessory building regulations from Main building 
regulations in Zone Ordinances, Discussed clarification that Lassen 
typed up. Nothing was really changed, it was just separated out to make it 
clear. May recommended that the setbacks for accessory buildings meet fire 
code and not have a set measurement. Blair argued that that would cause too 
many problems if the buildings met fire code and were built on the property 
line. It would infringe on the neighbors property. 
7. Amending Zoning ordinances to reflect International Building Code, 
8. Adopting the Fire Code. 
9. Adjourned. 
Meeting 8:00 P.M. 
1. Call to Order 
2. Roll Call - Attending: Hash, May, Lassen, Wadleigh, and Blair 
3. Approval of Minutes 
a, February 10, 2003 - approve next month 
4. Citizen Comment 
5. New Business 
a. Amending Chapter 25 (Sign Ordinance 25-1) (Action) - Motion to recommend 
to Town Council with the amendments discussed in the work session. Seconded. 5 ayes. 
b. Amending Zoning Ordinance to reflect International Building Code. - Motion 
to recommend to Town Council to reflect the IBC. Seconded. 5 ayes. 
c. Adopting Fire Code. - Do not recommend adopting until we have read it. 
d. Separating accessory building regulations from main building regulations in 
zoning Ordinances. — Motion to recommend to Town Council the amendments in 
the draft presented by Lassen. Seconded. 4 ayes. 1 nay. 
6. Old Business 
a. Recommendation forwarded to Town Council of Set Backs of Residential and 
Commercial. (Action) — same as above 
b. Amending Chapter 16, (To reflect State of Utah's newest adopted Building 
Code) (Action) — Motion to recommend to Town Council the amendments discussed in 
the work session. Seconded. 5 ayes. 
7. Final Comment 
8. Adjournment. 
Approved by Commission: 
Boudicca Joseph, Chairperson Date 
Gail Spoto, TowtfClerk Date 
.£, 
000019.\D 
Exhibit I 
AGENDA 
Big Water Municipal Corporation 
Town Council Public Hearing and Meeting 
Town Hall - March 25, 2003 
7:45 p.m. Executive Session, 8:00 p.m. Meeting & Public Hearing 
7:45 P.M. Executive Session 
1. Call to Order 
2. Roll Call 
3. Move to Executive Session - Discussi* s 
4. Adjournment 
8:00 P.M. Town Council Meeting 
1. Call to Order 
2. Roll Call 
3. Pledge of Allegiance 
4. Announcements 
5. Citizen Comment 
6. Resolution 2003-483, Appointing Town Council Member 
7. Public Hearing 
Ordinance 2003-215, (Amending Chapter-16) 
Ordinance 2003-216, (Amending Set Backs) 
Ordinance 2003-217, (Amending Chapter-25) 
8. Approval of Minutes 
a. January 21, 2003 
b. February 18, 2003 
9. STANDING REPO1 
Mayor 
Town Marshal 
Justice Court 
Financial Report 
Planning and Zoning 
Fire Report 
Building Report 
10. Old Business — 
Shepler 
G.C.S.S.D. Consollc n 
Consolidation 
Survey 
Resolution 2003-485, Street Paving Project 
11. New Business -
Rodeo Arena 
ISG Resources - Potash Silo 
Ordinance 2003-215, (Amending Chapter-16, Zoning Ordinance) 
Ordinance 2003-216, (Amending Set Backs, Residential & Commercial) 
Ordinance'2003-217, (Amending Chapter-25, Signs) 
Resolution 2003-484, Appointing Board of Adjustment Member 
12. Final Comment 
13. Adjourned. 
Exhibit J 
Big Water Municipal Corporation 
Town Council Minutes 
March 25, 2003 
7:45 p.m. Executive Session 
1. Mayor Marshall called the Executive Session to Order at 7:45 p.m. Parsons and 
Hoover attended. Tornbom absent and Rankin Resigned. Discussion of the Qualifications 
of Town Council seat applicants. 
• 8:00 p.m. Meeting 
1. Mayor Marshall called the meeting to order at 8:20 p.m. 
2. Roll Call - Attending: Parsons, Hoover and Mayor Marshall. Tornbom absent. Rankin 
resigned. 
3. Announcements - None. 
4. Citizen Comment - Inquires as to the decisions that are made in Executive Session. 
State Law reads, no decisions are made in Executive Sessions, discussion only. 
5. Resolution 2003-483, Appointing Town Council Member - Hoover moves to appoint 
Teresa Bybee to the Town Council seat. Parsons Seconds. 3 Aye. 1 Absent. 
Teresa Bybee sworn in by Judge King for the Town Council seat, replacing Raymond 
Rankin. 
6. Public Hearing 
Ordinance 2003-215, (Amending Chapter-16) 
Ordinance 2003-216, (Amending set backs) 
Ordinance 2003-217, (Amending Chapter- 25) 
Carol Addy requests information on the Amendments. Lassen details Amendments of all 
Ordinances. 
7. Next Meeting. 
Standing Reports 
8. Mayor's Report - Increase in water rates, the need for a Commercial Inspector and 
Zoning issues were the highlight of the Mayor's month. 
9. Town Marshal - Marshal Gerald Crane gave the report for the month of March 2003. 
Spoke of the advantages of a second officer. 
10. Justice Court — None. 
11. Financial Report - Lassen gave the financial report for the month of March 2003. 
12. Planning and Zoning - No Report 
13. Fire Report - None. 
14. Building Report - The Mayor read the Building Inspector report for the month of 
March 2003. 
15. Old Business-
Shepler-None. 
G.C.S.S.D. Consolidation - The Mayor would like to set a date for a joint meeting 
with the Water Board, to discuss consolidating lots. 
Lot Consolidation - Marshall outlined the process of Lot Consolidating in Big 
Water. He spoke of alternatives. 
2 
Survey - Bo Joseph explained the need for a survey of plat "A". A Survey will need 
to be done before lot consolidating procedure can start. Parsons makes a motion to 
approve $1500.00 for a survey of plat "A". Hoover seconds the motion. 4 Ayes. 
1 Absent. 
Resolution 2003- 485, Street Paving Project-
16. New Business -
Fair Grounds - Parsons moves to forward idea to Planning and Zoning. Hoover 
seconds. 4 Aye. 1 Absent. 
ISG Resources - Fly ash Silo - ISG representatives explain the product and what 
they would like to do in Big Water. Town Council recommends ISG Silo to Planning 
and Zoning with their endorsement. 
Ordinance 2003-215, ( Amending Chapter-16) Hoover motions to approve Ord 
2003-215, amended Chapter 16. Teresa seconds. 4Ayes. 1 Absent. 
Ordinance 2003-216, (Amending set backs) Parsons motions to approve Ord 2003-
216, amended set backs. Hoover seconds. 4 Ayes. 1 Absent. 
Ordinance 2003—217, (Amending chapter- 25, Signs) Teresa moves to approve Ord 
2003-217, amending Chapter 25-Signs. Sheri Hill seconds. 4 Ayes. 1 Absent. 
17. Final Comment. 
18. Adjourned 10:27 p.m. 
Approved by Council: 
Willy Marshall, Mayor Date 
teail Spoto, fawn, Clerk Date 
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Exhibit K 
ge one ot tour 
Chapter 2 
Definitions 
2-1 Definitions 
Words and terms in this Ordinance are qualified as follows: words used in the present tense include the 
future; words in the singular include the plural and the plural the singular; words not included herein but 
defined in the Uniform Building Code shall be construed as if defined herein. 
1) Agriculture - The tilling of soil, the raising of crops, horticulture, and gardening, including 
the keeping or raising of animals and fowl but not including any agricultural industry or 
business such as packing plants, fur farms, animal hospitals, or similar uses. 
2) Alley - is any public way or thoroughfare less than 16 feet, but not less than 10 feet in width 
that has been dedicated or deeded to the public for public use. 
3) Alteration - is any change, addition or modification in construction or occupancy. 
4) Apartment - A multiple-family dwelling/building or portion thereof which contains 3 or 
more dwelling units occupied as living quarters, rented to families on a permanent (month-to-
month) basis, with no renting or sub-letting of rooms permitted. 
5) Apartment Hotel/Motel - Any building which contains dwelling units and also satisfies the 
definition of hotel or a motel as defined herein. 
6) Basement - A story fully or partially below grade. 
7) Bed and Breakfast/Boarding House - A commercial building with guest rooms where meals 
may be provided. All uses pertaining to a residence will be allowed. 
8) Building - is any structure used or intended for supporting or sheltering any use or 
occupancy. 
9) Building, Accessory - is any garage, shed, shop or storage building not permitted, intended or 
used for human habitation. 
10) Building, Height of- The vertical distance from the highest grade to the highest point of the 
coping of a flat roof or to the deck line of a mansard roof or the average height of the highest 
gable of a pitched or hipped roof. 1997 UBC Section 209-H 
11) Building, Main - The principal building or one of the principal buildings upon a lot. 
12) Building, Public - A building owned and/or operated or owned and intended to be operated 
by a public agency of the United States, the State of Utah, County of Kane, Town of Big 
Water* or any of it's subdivisions. 
13) Carport - A private garage not completely enclosed by walls or doors. A carport is subject to 
all the regulations prescribed herein for a private garage. 
14) Child Nursery/Day Care - An establishment for the care and/or instruction of six or more 
children for compensation. 
15) Conditional Use - A use of land for which a conditional use permit is required pursuant to 
Chapter 18 of this Ordinance. 
16) Commission - The Big Water Planning and Zoning Commission. 
17) Condominium - A system of separate ownership of individual units in a multiple-unit 
building. 
18) Construction Camp - A camp or other residential area of a temporary nature established for 
a period of five or more days for the housing of persons engaged in activities related to 
construction or mining. Camps established for hunting, fishing, recreation, or agricultural 
purposes are excluded from this definition. 
19) Court - is a space, open and unobstructed to the sky, located at or above grade level on a lot 
and bounded on three or more sides by walls of a building. 
20) Dwelling - is any building or portion thereof that contains not more than 2 dwelling units. 
21) Dwelling, Single-Family - A building or building designed for occupancy by one family. 
22) Electric Generating Station - An installation containing prime mover electric generators, 
auxiliary equipment, and/or providing for fuel storage 
23) Exotic Animals - Animals not historically tound on farms in Southern Utah Exotic animals 
shall include animals commonly found in zoos and animal preserves, or are not historically 
endemic to the Southern Utah Area 
24) Floor Area - The aiea obtained by multiplying the outside length by the outside width of a 
building 
25) Footprint - The Projection of the primary exterior vertical walls of a structure upon the 
ground Does not include overhangs, eaves, or systems of poses or supports whose purpose is 
to support an otherwise unenclosed system of eaves or overhangs 
26) Foundation - Concrete footing built to Uniform Building Code 
27) Frontage - The length of the front property line of the lot, lots, or tract of land abutting a 
public street, road, or highway, or rural right-of-way 
28) Garage, Public - A commercial building or portion thereof, designed or used for servicing, 
repairing, equipping, hiring, selling, or storing motor vehicles or craft 
29) Grade - (Adjacent Ground Elevation) is the lowest point of elevation of the finished surface 
of the ground, paving or sidewalk within the area between the building and the property line 
or, when the property line is more than 5 feet from the building, between the building and a 
line 5 feet from the building 1997 UBC Section 208-G 
*NATURAL GRADE - undisturbed soil, none has been added 
* EXISTING GRADE - refers to grade at time of construction, when the property was bought It may be 
the natural grade or below it 
*FINISHED GRADE - refers to the level of the soil when the structure is finished 
30) Home Occupation - A business or profession carried out in a residence by the occupants of 
the residence 
31) Hotel - is any building containing 6 or more guest rooms intended or designed to be used, or 
that are used, rented or hired out to be occupied, or that are occupied for sleeping purposes by 
paying guests 
32) Household Pets - Animals and/or fowl ordinarily permitted m the house or yard and kept for 
the company or pleasure of the household Household pets may include but not be limited to 
the keeping of dogs, cats, chickens, ducks, rabbits, sheep, and goats No more than three 
dogs, three cats (not including puppies or kittens less than fourjnonths old), two sheep or two 
goats and six fowl or six rabbits per household "Household pets" does not include inherently 
or potentially dangerous animals, fowl or reptiles 
33) Junkyard - Any place, establishment, or business maintained, used, or operated for storing, 
keeping, buying, or selling junk, including sanitary fills and salvage yards within an enclosure 
and separate from all dwellings, which is given proper attention and care to E P A 
Regulations and sanitation 
34) Junk - Any discarded material, including but not limited to scrap metal, one or more 
abandoned, inoperable, and/or unlicensed motor vehicles, boats, machinery, equipment, 
paper, glass, containers, and structures 
35) Kennel - Any premises, building or structure m which four or more animals are harbored 
while being bred for sale, boarded or trained Kennels are conditional uses in all zones 
36) Landscaping - to make a plot of ground more attractive, as by adding lawns, bushes, etc All 
disturbed areas of a lot must be landscaped in order to achieve dust control 
37) Livestock - Animals historically found on farms in Southern Utah, including horses, cattle, 
sheep, goats, fowl and other similar domestic animals 
38) Livestock Feedyard - A commercial operation on a parcel of land where livestock are kept 
m corrals or yards for extended periods of time at a density which permits little movement 
and where all feed is provided for the purpose of fattening or maintaining the condition of 
livestock prior to their shipment 
39) Lot - A parcel of contiguous land having frontage upon a street which is or may be a 
developed or utilized under one ownership or control as a unit site for a permitted or 
conditionally-permitted use or group of uses Except for multiple-family dwellings, no more 
than one dwelling structure shall occupy any one residentially zoned lot unless the 
Commission has approved additional structures under a conditional use permit 
40) Lot Coverage - Lot coverage shall be calculated by taking the ground area of the main and 
accessory building and dividing that total by the area of the lot 
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§ 9.27 AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING 
already classified as a public road by force of statute,88 and where 
the land in issue was too small to accommodate a residential 
use.39 
The same access problem has arisen where a multiple-dwelling 
use sought to establish access through a more restrictive residen-
tial zone. A Connecticut court held that a proposed 60-foot 
driveway to be constructed across a single-family district, to 
provide an access route for an apartment complex, would violate 
the use restrictions of the district.90 However, an Illinois court 
held that an ordinance limiting land to single-family use is not 
violated by a driveway which provides access to a multiple resi-
dence located in another district.91 
§ 9.28. —Accessory uses. 
Zoning ordinances which establish residential districts usually 
permit accessory uses. A representative provision authorizes "Ac-
cessory residential uses and structures, clearly incidental to the 
permitted principal use, including servants quarters, guest houses 
and bomb shelters, excluding accessory dwellings of other 
types."92 Many ordinances are less specific, providing simply for 
accessory uses, or accessory uses and accessory buildings. A defi-
nition of "accessory use" may be included, as, for example: "Ac-
cessory building and use—A subordinate building located on the 
same lot with the main building, or subordinate use of land, ei-
ther of which is customarily incident to the main building or to 
the principal use of land."93 The courts, as well as the municipal 
88. Mahnke v Coughenour, 170 Colo 
61, 458 P2d 747 (1969). 
89. Where enforcement of residen-
tial zoning of a strip concededly too 
small to suppor t a res ident ia l use 
would bar the only access to landown-
er's adjacent business property, a vari-
ance should have been granted by the 
zoning board. Lapenas v Zoning Board 
of Appeals, 352 Mass 530, 226 NE2d 
361 (1967). 
90. Park Constr. Co. v Planning & 
Zoning Board of Appeals, 142 Conn 30, 
110 A2d 614 (1954) 
Owners of an apartment in a com-
mercial zone sought to use an adjoin-
ing lot zoned residential for a driveway 
for ingress and egress. The court held 
that under the ordinance the proposed 
use was not permit ted , ei ther ex-
pressly or by implication. Williams v 
Bloomington, 108 111 App 2d 307, 247 
NE2d 446 (1969, 4th Dist). 
91. People ex rel. First Nat. Bank v 
Deerfield, 50 111 App 2d 349, 200 NE2d 
120 (1964, 2d Dist). 
92. Charlotte, N. C , Zoning Ordi-
nance §§ 23-31 (1973). 
93. Little Rock, Ark, Zoning Ordi-
nance § 43-1(1) (1973). 
"Given the broad but definable 
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legislative bodies, have recognized that if the control of land use 
is to be workable, it must permit uses collateral to the main uses 
of land. A New Jersey court said: "Use by a family of a home 
under our customs includes more than simple use of a house and 
grounds for food and shelter. It also includes its use for private 
religious, educational, cultural and recreational advantages of 
the family."94 
range of activity which is included 
within the use of property 'for a single 
family residence' it cannot be said that 
the activities incidental to the mainte-
nance of a single family res idence 
need to be specified separately in or-
der for a statute to meet the certainty 
required under due process standards, 
it is not necessary t h a t it furnish 
detailed plans and specifications of the 
acts or conduct prohibited. Reasonable 
certainty . . is all that is required." 
Thus an ordinance restricting single-
family resident ial zone to specified 
types of uses is a valid exercise of po-
lice power and not unconstitutionally 
vague given the universal acceptance 
of the meaning of residential. Sechnst 
v Municipal Court for San Antonio 
Judicial Dist., 64 Cal App 3d 737, 134 
Cal Rptr 733 (1976, 2d Dist). 
An accessory use has been defined 
as "a use customarily incident to the 
principal use and so necessary or com-
monly to be expected in conjunction 
therewith that it cannot be supposed 
the ordinance was intended to prevent 
it." Holcomb v Denver, 199 Colo 251, 
606 P2d 858 (1980). 
"By definition, an accessory use is 
one which is incidental or subordinate 
to the principal use of a parcel permit-
ted by the zoning law." Zalarick v 
Monroe County, 467 So 2d 1088 (1985, 
Fla App D3), citing Anderson, Ameri-
can Law of Zoning (2nd ed) § 16.11. 
An accessory use is a subordinate 
use, clearly incidental to and related 
to the principal structure, building or 
use of the land. Beatrice v Gooden-
kauf, 219 Neb 756, 366 NW2d 411 
(1985), c i t ing Anderson, Amer ican 
Law of Zoning (2nd ed) § 16.11. 
In order to qualify as an accessory 
use, the use must not be the principal 
use of the property, but rather, a use 
occasioned by the principal use and 
subordinate to it. Salem v Durrett, 125 
NH 29, 480 A2d 9 (1984)'. 
"Uses customarily incident to single 
family dwellings" means the class of 
activity a family customarily does in 
or about the home and does not limit 
the activi ty to those identical uses 
chosen by their neighbors as long as 
the activity is a form of family hobby, 
recreation or education. Even though 
it is unusual, it is permissible unless 
specifically excluded by a zoning reso-
lution. D e t t m a r v County Board of 
Zoning Appeals, 28 Ohio Misc 35, 57 
Ohio Ops 2d 17, 273 NE2d 921 (1971). 
A township ordinance applicable to 
accessory uses in single family resi-
dential districts required such uses to 
be subordinate to the principle use of 
land or building or other structure on 
a lot. A vacant dwelling house unoccu-
pied for sometime could not constitute 
a principle use of property to entit le 
applicant to repair and store his truck 
and trailer on the property as an ac-
cessory use to the use of the dwelling 
house wi th in the mean in g of said 
ordinance. Sojtori v Douglass Town-
ship Board of Supervisors, 6 Pa Cm-
wlth 552, 296 A2d 532 (1972). 
94. Cha tham v Donaldson, 69 N J 
Super 277, 174 A2d 213 (1961). 
An accessory or incidental use is a 
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While the necessity for permitting accessory use must be admit-
ted, the objectives of the comprehensive plan will be jeopardized 
if accessory use is so broadly construed as to allow incompatible 
uses to invade a residential district. The possibility that a use ac-
cessory to a nonconforming use may become a new and injurious 
one if it is not checked has been noted in an earlier section.95 A 
subsequent chapter will be devoted to home occupations which 
are maintained either pursuant to specific ordinance provisions, 
or as accessory uses.96 This section is devoted to the miscellaneous 
uses and structures which are built or maintained on the as-
sumption that they are accessory to the residential use of land.97 
An addition to a main building or structure on a lot is not an 
accessory building or structure.98 Thus, an addition to accom-
modate a bedroom and bath constituted an encroachment on 
required yard space, although an accessory structure could have 
been built in such space.w An expansion of a building which 
housed a clinic maintained as a nonconforming use was disap-
proved on the ground that the home was not occupied as a resi-
dence and that the addition could not be regarded as an acces-
sory building.' A garage is regarded as an accessory use, but this 
status is in doubt when the garage is to be used for servicing and 
maintenance.i A carport is regarded as an accessory use,J and a 
dock has been held an accessory use where the residential land 
use customarily incident to the princi-
pal use, and so necessary or commonly 
to be expected in conjunction there-
with t ha t it cannot be supposed the 
ordinance was intended to prevent it. 
Sheridan v Keen, 34 Colo App 228, 524 
P2d 1390 (1974). 
95. See § 6.33 in Volume 1. 
96. See Chapter 13 in Volume 2. 
97. See genera l ly Symposium on 
New England Zoning, Zoning in New 
England, 36 Buffalo L Rev p 331 (1956); 
55 Cal J u r 2d, Zoning § 103. 
Annotat ion: Application of zoning 
regulation to radio or television facili-
ties. 81 ALR3d 1086. 
98. "An 'accessory building' is a 
bui lding (such as a private garage, 
pr ivate swimming pool and appurte-
nant bathhouse, private toolhouse or 
c h i l d r e n ' s p l a y h o u s e or a non-
commercial greenhouse) which is sub-
ordinate and accessory to a principal 
building on the same lot and which is 
used for purposes customarily inciden-
tal to those of the principal building." 
Planning and Zoning Regulations, Vil-
lage of Scarsdale, N.Y. § 12-2-1 (1961). 
99. Carney v Baltimore, 201 Md 130, 
93 A2d 74 (1952). 
1. West Helena v Bockman, 221 Ark 
677, 256 SW2d 40 (1953). 
2. The storage and maintenance of a 
racing stock car in a garage accessory 
to a single family dwelling may ratio-
nally be regarded as use which is ac-
cessory to the residential occupation 
of the dwelling This conclusion is sup-
ported by the fact tha t the car was 
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was on the lakeshore."1 However, a garage to house a seaplane, 
constructed on residential land abutting a lake, was held not an 
accessory use.3 Tennis courts have frequently been held to be ap-
propriate accessory uses.6 A stable to house two horses may 
qualify as an accessory use in a neighborhood where other land-
owners maintain such uses.7 Some municipalities specifically 
include childrens' playhouses and playground equipment as a 
operated as a hobby and not an oc-
cupation. Shumate v Zimmerman, 166 
Colo 488, 444 P2d 872 (1968). 
It was a question of fact to be de-
cided by the town board of appeals 
whether and to what extent a proposed 
garage, to be used for servicing and 
preventive maintenance, and the stor-
ing of the lessee's vehicles was an ac-
cessory use within the applicable by-
law Salah v Board of Appeals, 2 Mass 
App 488, 314 NE2d 881 (1974). 
The court held that where an ordi-
nance authorized as an accessory use 
a garage to be used for the storage or 
for parking of family or pleasure ve-
hicles, a grant of a variance from that 
o r d i n a n c e to e rec t a " m e c h a n i c a l 
shop" did not authorize the construc-
tion of a building to be used for the 
repair and storage of heavy construc-
tion equipment. Barbato v Board of 
Appeal, 355 Mass 264, 244 NE2d 308 
(1969). 
An o rd inance p e r m i t t i n g garage 
space for cars as an accessory use in a 
res ident ia l district does not permit 
storage of an airplane therein. Build-
ing Inspector of Falmouth v Gingrass, 
338 Mass 274, 154 NE2d 896 (1959), 
noted 26 Missouri L Rev p 371 (1961). 
The storage of construction vehicles 
in a garage is unlawful in a district 
where residential garages are permit-
ted but commercial uses are pro-
scribed. County of Fayette v Blout, 35 
Pa Cmwlth 523, 387 A2d 167 (1978). 
3. Nelson v Goddard, 43 Mich App 
615, 204 NW2d 739 (1972). 
4. A dock constructed on five feet of 
shoreland was a permitted accessory 
use to residential lakeshore property. 
Talbot v Gray, 11 Wash App 807, 525 
P2d 801 (1974). 
5. Building Inspector of Falmouth, 
338 Mass 274, 154 NE2d 896 (1959), 
noted 26 Missouri L Rev p 371 (1961). 
Annotat ion: Meaning of t e rm ga-
rage as used in zoning regulation. 11 
ALR3d 1187. 
6. Henderson v Zoning Appeals Bd., 
328 So 2d 175 (1975, La App 4th Cir), 
cert den (La) 331 So 2d 474; Kitreli v 
Board of Adjustment, 201 Neb 130, 266 
NW2d 724 (1978); Crane v Bitterman, 
55 App Div 2d 669, 390 NYS2d 179 
(1976, 2d Dept); Klein v Lower Ma-
cungie, 39 Pa Cmwlth 81, 395 A2d 609 
(1978); Currey v Kimple, 577 SW2d 
508 (1978, Tex Civ App Texarkana) , 
writ ref n r e. 
"Items which are used for private, 
recreational purposes of a homeowner 
. . . should therefore be considered 
'customarily incidental' to the permit-
ted uses in a residential district." Be-
noff v Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 84 
Pa Cmwlth 309, 479 A2d 68 (1984). 
Annotation: Application of Zoning 
Regulations to Golf Courses, Swim-
ming Pools, Tenn is Cour ts , or t he 
Like. 32 ALR3d 424. 
7. Sacco v Inspector of Bldgs., 3 Mass 
App 749, 327 NE2d 924 (1975). 
Compare Thomas v Zoning Hearing 
Bd., 121 Pa Cmwlth 393, 550 A2d 1045 
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permitted accessory in a residential district to prevent complaints 
that such items constitute a neighborhood eyesore 8 
The problem of accessory buildings may be complicated by a 
regulation which prohibits more than one principal building on a 
lot Under such a provision, the conversion of an accessory ga-
rage9 or other building10 would be unlawful without a variance.11 
The word "customary" is commonly used m the regulation 
permitting an accessory use, 01 in the definition of such use Ac-
cordingly, the courts have sought to determine, in the case of 
each use, whether it is customary to maintain it in conjunction 
with the use of land as a residence 12 The proliferation of ama-
teur radio stations has generated litigation concerning the erec-
tion of radio antenna towers in residential districts Some courts 
have found that the maintenance of television and radio anten-
nas m residential districts is customary,13 and on this analogy 
have upheld as accessory uses "ham" radio towers as high as 100 
(1988) (keeping of horse was a proper 
accessory use) with Town of Windham 
v Alfond, 523 A2d 42 (1986, NH) (keep-
ing of horse was not a permitted ac 
cessory use) And cf 1 lrpak v Borough 
of Summit , 101 Pa Cmwlth 167, 515 
A2d 1018 (1986) (keeping of 1,000-
pound pig as a pet was not a propei 
accessory use) 
8. Burleigh County, N D Zoning 
Ordinance § 7 1(A)(3) (1973) 
9. D B S Bldg Asso v Ene, 177 Pa 
Super 487, 111 A2d 367 (1955) 
10. Cobble Close Farm v Boaid of 
Adjus tment , 10 N J 442, 92 A2d 4 
(1952) 
Use of building located on rear of 
property owner's lot as a living quar 
te rs for employee ca re takers or by 
s tudent ren te r s was not permissible 
under city zoning ordinance which 
peimitted only one single-family resi 
dence on each lot Trent v Pittsburg, 5 
Kan App 2d 543, 619 P2d 1171 (1980) 
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11. An oidinance which limited the 
number of buildings upon one lot to a 
main building and accessoiy struc-
tures prohibited the building of two 
dwellings despite the fact t ha t each 
fionted on a different stieet Jackson 
v Kirkland 276 So 2d 654 (1973, Miss) 
12 To determine whether a use of 
land is peimitted as an accessory use, 
it is not enough to determine whether 
that use is incidental to the main use, 
the use must be habitually, commonly, 
and by long practice established as a 
reasonable use Factors to considei 
ai e size of the lot in question, nature 
of the pnmary use, use made of adja-
cent lots economic s t ruc tu ie of the 
area, and actual incidents of similar 
use in the area Lawrence v Zoning 
Board of Appeals, 158 Conn 509, 264 
A2d 552 (1969) 
13. St Louis Park v Casey, 218 Minn 
394, 16 NW2d 459 155 ALR 1128 
(1944), noted 43 Michigan L Rev p 998 
(1945), Appeal of Lord, 368 Pa 121, 81 
A2d 533 (1951) 
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feet u However, the New York Court of Appeals rejected the 
analogy to the modest television antenna positioned atop many 
residential roofs, holding that a 44-foot tower is not a customary 
accessory use 15 And a Pennsylvania court ruled that a 12-foot 
disc-shaped television receiver was not a customary use 16 To 
qualify as an accessory use in a residential district, a radio tower 
must be used for a radio station operated by an amateur " An 
antenna tower which serves a commercial station is not a cus-
tomary accessory use in a residential district u Not all hobbies 
have been treated as kindly as that of the amateur radio opera-
tor A Tennessee court held that the removal of parts from cars 
and the assembling of racing cars for amateur use was not cus-
tomarily accessory to a single-family residential use 19 
A fallout shelter is a use accessory to a residential building.30 
The same result has been reached with respect to private swim-
ming pools 21 Where a private club is a permitted use, a swim-
ming pool for membei s is a use accessory thereto a 
The parking of three cars in the driveway of a dwelling is a 
14. Skinner v Zoning Board of Ad 
justment , 80 N J Supei 380, 193 A2d 
861 (1963) 
15. Presnell v Leslie, 3 NY2d 384, 
165 NYS2d 488, 144 NE2d 381 '1957) 
discussed in Court of Appeals 1956 
Term—Municipal Coiporations 7 Buf-
falo L Rev p 160 (1957-58) 
16. Brown v Salisbury Township 23 
Pa D & C 3d 708 '1982) 
17. Wright v Vogt, 7 NJ 1 80 A2d 
108 (1951) 
18 Muskegon Heights v Wilson 363 
Mich 263, 109 NW2d 768 (1961) 
A radio t ransmiss ion tower which 
serves a commercial enterprise is not 
an accessory use in a lesidential dis 
t r ic t , and it is not permiss ib le al-
though the zoning ordinance autho 
n z e s r a d i o a n d TV a n t e n n a e 
Hohmann v Thomsen, 32 App Div 2d 
669, 300 NYS2d 781 (1969, 2d Dept) 
19. Knoxville v Biown, 195 Tenn 
501, 260 SW2d 264 (1953) 
20. Place v Board of Adjustment, 42 
NJ 324, 200 A2d 601, 7 ALR3d 1434 
(1964) 
Annotat ion: Construction and ap-
plication of zonmg legulations in con-
nection with bomb or fallout shelters 
7 ALR3d 1443 
21. Mandel v Nusbaum, 526 NYS2d 
179 11988, App Div) (attached swim-
ming pool complex was accessory 
structure), Bloomfield v Panzot, 88 NJ 
Super 181, 211 A2d 230 (1965), Thomas 
v Zoning Bd of Adjustment, 241 SW2d 
955 (1951, Tex Civ App) 
22. Tullo v Millburn, 54 N J Super 
483, 149 A2d 620 (1959) 
A reasonable r ec rea t ion facility, 
including a lighted field when night 
baseball is played, is not a nuisance 
per se and is permissible as an acces-
sory use Corporat ion of P res id ing 
Bishop, etc v Ashton, 92 Idaho 571, 
448 P2d 185 (1968) 
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cus tomary accessory use of residential pioperty,2 3 but pa rk ing 
commercial vehicles is not24 A private airport is not a permit ted 
accessory use in a district zoned for single-family and two-family 
dwellings.25 
Where an ordinance expressly pi ohibited the park ing of com-
merc ia l vehicles, the court held tha t t he p a r k i n g of a p ickup 
t ruck, let tered with the owner's trade name and used by him to 
travel to and from work, in a residential district was not a permit-
ted accessory use 2fi Similarly, where an 01 dmance prohibited the 
outdoor park ing of camp trai leis , the court upheld the measure , 
saying tha t "current authorit ies recognize neighborhood aesthet-
23. Cha tham v Donaldson, 69 N J 
Super 277, 174 A2d 213 (1961) 
24 People v Scrafano, 307 Mich 655, 
12 NW2d 325 (1943), Nor thva le v 
Blundo, 85 N J Super 56, 203 A2d 721 
(1964), Cook v Bensalem Township 
Zoning Board of Adjustment 413 Pa 
175, 196 A2d 327 (1963), Taddeo v 
Commonwealth, 49 Pa Cmwlth 485, 
412 A2d 212 (1980) 
The storage of a road grader in an 
area zoned resident ial and agricul 
tural does not qualify as an accessoiy 
use under the town zoning ordinance 
as it neither bears a reasonable iela-
tionship to a residential use nor con-
st i tutes a use customarily incidental 
to the primary use Becker v Hampton 
Falls, 117 NH 437, 374 A2d 653 (1977) 
Generally, pai king a commercial ve-
hicle that is not accessory to residen 
tial property is prohibited by its very 
absence from the s t a tu to ry list of 
permitted uses Howevei an exception 
is made where a small commercial ve 
h ide , 3U ton or less, can be scieened 
from public sight in a garage thus 
minimizing the deleterious effect on 
the neighborhood Galhford v Com 
monweal th 60 Pa Cmwlth 175 430 
A2d 1222 (1981) 
See also St Charles County v Mc-
Peak, 730 SW2d 611 (1987, Mo App) 
(repair of commercial trucks prohib-
ited from residential district) 
25 Samsa v Heck, 13 Ohio App 2d 
94, 42 Ohio Ops 2d 208, 234 NE2d 312 
(1967, Summit Co) 
An aircraf t landing s t r ip for the 
personal use of the landowner is an 
appropriate accessory use to a residen-
tial dwelling in an agiicultuial dis-
trict Schantz v Rachhn 101 NJ Super 
334 244 A2d 328 (1968), affd 104 N J 
Super 154, 249 A2d 18 
See also Redington Ranch Asso v 
Redman 153 Ariz App 437, 737 P2d 
808 (1987) (use of helicopter was not 
accessoiy use) But cf Tr iesman v 
Town of Bedford 563 A2d 786 (1989, 
NH) (ordinance amended to allow stor-
age and operation of helicopters as ac-
cessory use in iesidential and agucul-
tural zones) 
The p a i k m g of schoolbuses is a 
permitted accessory use in a district 
where the school served by the bus is 
located but the repan of schoolbuses 
is not an accessoiy use permitted m a 
district which allows schools and their 
accessory uses People v Firestone, 48 
Misc 2d 480 265 NYS2d 179 (1965), 
Mergenthaler v State 293 A2d 287 
(Del Sup) dist inguishing ' pa rk ing" 
from ' storage ' 
26 Northvale v Blundo, 81 NJ Super 
201, 195 A2d 221 (1963), affd 85 N J 
Supei 56 203 A2d 721 
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ICS to be integrally bound to property values and to be re levant 
considerat ions m zoning when they bear in a subs tan t ia l way 
upon land utilization "•" 
The es tab l i shment of a p a r k i n g lot to serve a commerc ia l 
enterprise located outside a residential district, or mainta ined as 
a nonconforming use inside such district, clearly is not a permit-
ted accessory use where the lot is separate from tha t occupied by 
the m a m building -s However, if the commercial or other use is 
mainta ined consistently with the zoning regulat ions as a permit-
ted or nonconforming use, parking on the lot occupied by the use 
may be an accessory thereto.-*9 
Pa rk ing m a residential district can of course be provided for 
m the regulations as an exception or specially permit ted use J0 
The commerc ia l uses which a r e r e g a r d e d as accessory to 
multiple-dwelling use will be discussed in a la ter section " Room-
ing and boarding house problems will be considered m Chapter 
13, since they a i e related to the general problem of home occupa-
27. Livingston v Maichev, 85 NJ 
Super 428, 205 A2d 65 (1964), ceitif 
den 44 NJ 412, 209 A2d 145 app dismd 
382 US 201, 15 L Ed 2d 269 86 S Ct 
393 
A zoning ordinance is not unreason 
able which prohibits the parking of a 
trailer more than 5 feet high on an 
improved lot in a residential district 
Glenview v Van Dyke, 98 111 App 2d 
118, 240 NE2d 354 (1968 1st Dist) 
See also Potts v City of Hugo, 416 
NW2d 465 (1987, Minn App) (stoiage 
of t ra i ler m open was not accessory 
use in residential d is tuc t ) , Texstar 
Constr v Boaid of Appeals 26 Mass 
App 977, 528 NE2d 1186 (1988) (ac 
cord) 
28. Re Application of E m m e t t S 
Hickman Co , 49 Del 13 108 A2d 667 
(1954, Sup) People v F ianshu Realty 
Co 4 App Div 2d 685, 163 NYS2d 692 
(1957, 2d Dept), Commonwea l th v 
Cieslak, 179 Pa Supei 441 115 A2d 
418 (1955), Piovidence v F u s t Nat 
Stores, Inc 100 RI 14 210 A2d 656 
(1965), Warwick v Campbell, 82 RI 
300, 107 A2d 334 (1954) 
Methadone main tenance program 
clmic facility opeiated by hospital but 
not on oi near hospital premises is still 
accessory use of hospital and may only 
be operated m aieas zoned for hospi-
ta l s People ex rel D Iorio v Alfa 
Realty Co 69 Misc 2d 475, 330 NYS2d 
403 (1972) 
Thiee story parking garage architec-
turally compatible with an apartment 
house was a valid accessoiy use to the 
apartment Wells v Fiscal Couit of Jef-
ferson County, 457 SW2d 498 (1970, 
Ky) 
29. Adley v Paiei, 148 Conn 84, 167 
A2d 449 (1961) 
30. Kline v Louisville & Jefferson 
County Bd of Zoning Adjustment & 
Appeals 325 SW2d 324 (1959, Ky), Bo-
wen v Hider 37 NYS2d 76 (1942, Sup), 
McCloud v Woodmansee, 165 Ohio St 
271, 59 Ohio Ops 361, 135 NE2d 316 
(1956) Steispair v Seais Roebuck & 
Co , 64 Ohio L Abs 520, 112 NE2d 548 
(1951 App Cuyahoga Co) 
31 . See § 9 40, infra 
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tions. The construct ion of facilities for servants and guests will 
be discussed m a la ter section of this chapter"" 
§ 9.29. S i n g l e f ami ly d i s t r i c t s , gene ra l l y . 
The division of t he community into districts, inc luding those 
limited to residential use, has been described in earlier sections M 
This section, and the ten sections which follow it, a re devoted to 
problems which re la te to residential districts in which land use is 
restr icted to single-family dwellings, sometimes with the addition 
of c e r t a i n r e l i g i o u s , c h a r i t a b l e , or educa t iona l u se s These 
distr icts seek to establish and to protect wha t the ear ly zoners 
considered to be the "highest" use of land, the dwelling con-
structed and used as a residence for one family w The vir tues of a 
single-family res ident ia l neighborhood were extolled by Jus t ice 
Douglas of t h e Un i t ed Sta tes Supreme Court in the following 
language "A quiet place where yards a ie wide, people few, and 
motor vehicles restr icted are legitimate guidelines in a land use 
project addressed to family needs This goal is a permissible one 
wi thm Berman v Pa rke r The police power is not confined 
to el iminat ion of filth, stench, and unheal thy places It is ample 
to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the bless-
ings of quiet seclusion, and clean air make the area a sanctuary 
for people "J° The New York Court of Appeals expressed its ap-
proval qui te simply It said "Fundamental ly , zoning ordinances 
arise out of and are sustained by considerations of the hea l th and 
32. See § 9 37, infra 
33. See §§ 9 02 and 9 24, supra 
34. A detached garage, having living 
quarters over the area where automo 
biles were kept was located on the 
same lot as a single family residence 
and rented to a second family This 
was not a permitted use in a one and 
two family residential district, as the 
o r d i n a n c e p e r m i t t e d onl> semi 
attached two family dwellings and ac 
cessory buildings Sanders v Board of 
Adjustment, 445 So 2d 909 (1983, Ala 
App) 
To achieve the purpose of ci eating 
places free from congestion and over-
population, as well as to promote fam-
ily values, the legislature may restrict 
the uses of property in a defined geo-
graphic area to single family dwell-
ings Rademan v Denver, 186 Colo 250, 
526 P2d 1325 (1974) 
An ordinance which restricts use to 
single family dwellings on one-acre 
lots accessory buildings and open-
space uses does not effect a taking 
without due process of law Agins v 
Tibuion, 447 US 255, 65 L Ed 2d 106, 
100 S Ct 2138 (1980) (not followed Bar-
bian v Panagis (CA7 Wis) 694 F2d 
476) 
35. Belle Terre v Boraas, 416 US 1, 
39 L Ed 2d 797 94 S Ct 1536 (1974) 
(not followed Char te r Township of 
Delta v Dinolfo 419 Mich 253, 351 
NW2d 831) 
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welfare of the community On t h a t basis we have sustained use 
regulations for the segregation m residential districts of detached, 
one-family houses from mult i - family houses and dwell ings."3 6 
Whi le t h e power to c r ea t e s ingle-family d i s t r i c t s c a n n o t be 
doubted, the severity of the restriction has resul ted in numerous 
challenges to the validity of single-family regulat ions as they ap-
ply to specific p r o p e r t y 37 T h e cases invo lv ing t h e ques t ion 
whether a classification of land for single-family use is or is not 
confiscatory are discussed m Chapter 3 
36. Baddour v Long Beach 279 NY 
167, 18 NE2d 18 124 ALR 1003 (1938), 
reh den 279 NY 794 19 NE2d 90 124 
ALR 1010, app dismd 308 US 503, 84 
L Ed 431, 60 S Ct 77 
Countv commission which was pre-
sented evidence tha t area zoned for 
single-family estate use and on which 
applicant wanted to construct a fifteen 
story apartment building with special 
exceptions after obtaining a change of 
zoning to multiple family use, was res-
idential m character adjoining a coun-
t iy club and was sui rounded by simi-
lar single family zoning, had before it 
sufficient facts in the form of compe 
tent substantia* evidence to sustain its 
ruling retaining single family zoning 
Dade County v Mcintosh 256 So 2d 
246 (1972, Fla App D3), cert den (Fla) 
261 So 2d 845 
Zoning statutes as implemented by 
the municipality in the furtherance of 
a comprehensive plan clearly em-
powei the municipal author i t ies to 
decline request for a permit to build 
two family duplexes in a single-family 
residence zone on subs tandard size 
lots, provided that such action is not 
unreasonable , a rb i t ra ry capricious, 
nor an abuse of discretion Jackson v 
Ridgway (Miss) 258 So 2d 439 (1972, 
Miss) 
See also Wilkins v San Bernardino, 
29 Cal 2d 332, 175 P2d 542 (1946) 
37. See, for example Long v High 
land Park, 329 Mich 146, 45 NW2d 10 
(1950) 
In determining the reasonableness 
of a zoning oi dinance, value of prop-
erty is a factor to be considered, but it 
is not of itself sufficient to invalidate a 
s i n g l e - f a m i l y z o n i n g o r d i n a n c e 
Lindgren v Chicago, 124 III App 2d 
289, 260 NE2d 271 (1970, 1st Dist) 
An amendment excluding two fam-
ily dwellings in cer ta in res ident ia l 
districts except by way of a special 
exception, was not invalid on the the-
ory tha t it was inconsistent with the 
comprehensive plan, although, zoning 
regulations permitted two family de-
tached houses at the time of the adop-
tion of the plan Storch v Zoning Bd 
of Howard County, 267 Md 476, 298 
A2d 8 (1972) 
A predominant ly residential area 
zoned for single-family housing was 
not zoned uncons t i tu t iona l ly as to 
plaintiffs property although a major 
h ighway was nea rby and the land 
would have greater value if rezoned 
Greater Bloomfield Real Estate Co v 
Bloomfield, 35 Mich App 437, 192 
NW2d 513 (1971) 
"The only difference between a 
single-family detached residence and a 
townhouse is t h a t townhouses a re 
constructed in clusters and are not 
detached In each instance, however, 
they are single-family residences " Vi-
enna Council v Kohler, 218 Va 966, 
244 SE2d 542 (1978) 
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Similar ly the Connect icut S u p r e m e court ru led t h a t a town s 
p lanning and zoning commission validly issued any m t e r p r e t a 
t ion of the zoning regula t ions holding t h a t keeping more t h a n 
four pet dogs in the town s r u r a l res ident ia l dis t r ic t was not a 
permissible accessory use 19 s 0 
1M0Graff v Zoning Bd of Appeals of Town of Kilhngworth 277 Conn 645 
894 A 2d 285 (2006) 
n 24 
Add to note 24 
South Carolina The owner of an 18 wheel Mack truck unsuccessfully at 
tempted to challenge enforcement of a zoning ordinance provision t h a t 
prohibited him from parking his vehicle outside his home at night and on 
weekends in Whaley v Dorchester County Zoning Bd of Appeals 337 S C 568 
524 S E 2d 404 (1999) The ordinance specifically prohibited long term parking 
of commercial vehicles in residential areas Among other issues the Court held 
that the parking of the cab of the vehicle was not an accessory use to the resi 
dence because it was not customarily incident to a residential zone " 524 S E 2d 
at 410 
§ 9 30 Fami ly defined, U n r e l a t e d p e r s o n s 
n 70 
Add to note 70 
New Mexico The Supreme Court of New Mexico has added to the cases 
supporting the establishment of group homes for persons with disabilities in 
single family residential zones In Hill v Community of Damien of Molokai 
1996 NMSC 008 121 N M 353 911 P 2d 861 14 A D D 667 (1996) neighbor 
ing property owners alleged tha t a four person home for persons with AIDS 
violated a restrictive covenant that prohibited the property from being used as 
anything other than a single family residence The court ruled tha t the group 
home was to be considered a single family residence for purposes of the 
covenant This interpretation was found by the court to be consistent with the 
strong public policy m favor of including small group homes within the defini 
tion of the term family " Furthermore the court held that the covenant would 
be in violation of the federal Fair Housing Act if it were interpreted to exclude 
the group home 
Pennsylvania But see Albert v Zoning Hearing Bd of North Abmgton Tp 
578 Pa 439 854 A 2d 401 (2004) in which a landowner applied for a license to 
operate a halfway house for recovering alcoholics and drug addicts in a low 
density residential district (the R 1 District") The application was premised on 
the notion that under Pennsylvania case law the facility (the Retreat ) * ould 
qualify as a single family detached dwelling which was a permissible use in 
the R 1 District under the local zoning ordinance The ZHB the trial court and 
the Commonwealth Court all ruled tha t the application should be granted on 
the grounds that the Retreat qualified as a single family detached dwelling 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed holding that the lower courts 
had erred by applying an over inclusive definition of family Differentiating 
the case at hand from Appeal of Miller 511 Pa 631 515 A 2d 904 (1986) the 
court declared that the Retreat could not qualify as a single family detached 
dwelling in light of the transience of its residents Albert v Zoning Hearing 
Bd of North Abmgton Tp 578 Pa 439 854 A 2d 401 at 406 (2004) The court 
stated 
Whale this Court has never before explicitly stated that transiency is incompatible 
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•with the notion of a single family household it is undeniable that inherent in the 
concept of family' and m turn in the concept of a single family dwelling is a certain 
expectation of relative stability and permanence in the composition of the familial 
unit Indeed one of the many benefits of single family zoning districts is that they 
create residential neighborhoods in which the residents may develop a sense of com 
munity and a shared commitment to the common good of that community Without 
some level of stability and permanence in the composition of the groups residing in 
3uch residential districts this goa' is necessanlv subverted Accordingly we 
conclude that in order to qualify as a single housekeeping unit a group of individu 
als in a single household must not only function as a family within that household 
but in addition the composition of the group must be sufficiently stable and perma 
nent so as not to be fairly characterized as purely transient Albert v Zoning Hearing 
Bd of North Abmgton Tp 578 Pa 439 854 A 2d 401 at 409 (2004) 
The court then set forth the factual basis for its conclusion that the Retreat s 
population would be too transient to qualify as a family 
Far from being a relatively stable and permanent assemblage the residents of the 
Retreat will change on a fairly regular basis In fact the entire premise of the Retreat 
is to lodge its residents for only so long as is necessary to prepare them to return to 
their own families Thus the average stay for a resident at the faculty is expected 
to be just two to six months and as a result the Retreat s entire population of six 
to fifteen women could turn over as many as six times a year This level of mstabuity 
and transience is simply incompatible with the single family concept Albert v Zoning 
Hearing Bd of North Abmgton Tp 578 Pa 439 854 A 2d 401 at 409 (2004) 
The court cautioned against reading its opinion in the Miller case supra 
too broadly when determining whether a group should be considered a family 
*We recognize that there is language in Miller suggesting that the focus of the 
family' inquiry should be directed to the quality of the relationship during the 
period of residency rather than its duration However we regard this language 
as dicta not a controlling holding Albert v Zoning Hearing Bd of North 
Abmgton Tp 578 Pa 439 854 A 2d 401 at 409 (2004) 
The landowner did prevail on one issue Opponents of the facility had made 
the additional argument tha t the Retreat did not qualify as a single family 
dwelling because it would be operated with a profit motive that was incompat 
ible with the single family concept The court found that the record simply does 
not support the conclusion tha t a profit motive would be the basis for the 
Retreat s relationships Albert v Zoning Hearing Bd of North Abmgton Tp 
578 Pa 439 854 A 2 d 401 at 409 (2004) 
Text add to the end of section 
In a case of first impress ion the S u p r e m e Cour t of Sou th 
Dakota held t h a t the s ta te constitution was not violated by a city 
ordinance t h a t defines family ' in such a way as to create a three 
person l imi t on t he n u m b e r of u n r e l a t e d adu l t s who m a y live 
toge ther in one res iden t i a l un i t City of Brookings v Winker 
1996 SD 129 554 N W 2d 827 (S D 1996) The owner of a duplex 
was convicted under the ordinance of rent ing one of the u m t s to 
four unrelated adul t college s tudents 
The duplex owner argued t h a t there was no ra t ional relat ion 
ship between the restrictive definition of family* and the objec 
tive of controll ing populat ion densi ty The s t a t e sup reme court 
began its const i tut ional analysis of t h a t claim by not ing t h a t 
South Dakota applies a more s t r ingent test to a challenged law 
than the rat ional basis tes t applied under federal law The exact 
wording of the South Dakota tes t is t ha t a s t a t u t e m u s t bea r a 
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access road to the mining operation, which is an accessory use to the main use, 
also is prohibited in a limited residential zoning district." Capelle, 269 Va. at 
66, 607 S.E.2d at 106. "Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court erred in 
holding tha t the County Code permitted the proposed access road as an acces-
sory use in the limited residential district incident to the special use permit for 
mining in the agricultural district." Capelle, 269 Va. at 67, 607 S.E.2d at 107. 
§ 9:28 Residential districts, generally—Accessory uses 
n. 93. 
Add to note 93: 
Mississippi: A zoning ordinance which prohibited accessory buildings or 
uses" in any front yard was unconstitutionally vague as applied to a tree house. 
Mayor & Bd. of Aldermen, City of Clinton v. Welch, 888 So. 2d 416 (Miss. 2004). 
The ordinance did not define "accessory buildings," but instead relied on a defi-
nition of "accessory structures" found in a different section without providing 
any notice that the latter definition applied. The ordinance also failed to define 
what "uses" were prohibited, and instead broadly defined "use" as the specific 
purpose for which land or a building is designed." The Supreme Court of Missis-
sippi stated: "With these definitions, the public is left to either guess what is an 
'accessory building,' and what is not, or appeal to the unfettered discretion of a 
City official who, on an ad hoc basis, decides the 'accessory building* du jour. 
This not only deprives the citizen of fair notice, but also unfairly requires the 
City official to make a decision without providing a clear standard or guideline." 
Mayor & Board of Alderman, City of Clinton, 888 So.2d at 423. The Court 
continued, "We find no fault with the City precluding 'buildings' or even 'acces-
sory buildings' in the front or side yards of homes. However, when the City adds 
to the prohibition the term 'use,' and it employs definitions of 'use' and 'acces-
sory structures ' so broad and vague that virtually anything could fall within the 
Ordinance's purview, it crosses the constitutional line." Mayor & Board of Al-
derman, City of Clinton, 888 So.2d at 428. 
n. 94. 
Add to note 94: 
Mississippi: A zoning ordinance which prohibited "accessory buildings or 
uses" in any front yard was unconstitutionally vague as applied to a tree house. 
Mayor & Bd. of Aldermen, City of Clinton v. Welch, 888 So. 2d 416 (Miss. 2004). 
See note 93, this section. 
n.4. 
Add to note 4: 
Michigan: But see Soupal v. Shady View, Inc., 469 Mich. 458, 672 N.W.2d 
171 (2003). A zoning ordinance did not allow property zoned for single-family 
use to be used by a multiple-family association for the operation of a mar ina 
containing 20 boat slips. Furthermore, the marina did not qualify as an acces-
sory use. "It is clear from the testimony that the cabin on lot 139 was designed 
to be a single-family dwelling. The lot, with its seventy-seven feet of lake front-
age, was intended to support that use. Operating the marina, irrespective of its 
commercial or noncommercial nature, is not 'related' to the property's permitted 
use as a single-family dwelling." 672 N.W.2d at 174. The Court also concluded 
that because the use of the property as a marina was in violation of the zoning 
ordinance, it was a nuisance per se. 
n. 5. . 
Add to note 5: 
Michigan: See also Soupal v. Shady View, Inc., 469 Mich. 458, 672 N.W.2d 
171 (2003) (marina was not an accessory use in a single-family zone), discussed 
at note 4, supra. 
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iu 13. 
Add to note 13: 
New Mexico: In Smith v. Bernalillo County, 2005-NMSC-012, 137 N.M. 280, 
110 P.3d 496 (2005), the Supreme Court of New Mexico held that a county could 
not reverse itself and prohibit the construction of two 130-foot amateur radio 
towers on residential property. The county had initially taken the position that 
the towers were a permissive use on the property under the zoning code, which 
allowed for s t ructures "customarily incidental" to rura l residential activities. 
Supplementary zoning regulations enacted by the county expressly exempted 
amateur radio towers from height limitations otherwise apphcable in the rural 
res ident ia l zone. The county issued building permi t s for the towers, but 
subsequent ly reversed its position and a t tempted to ha l t construction after 
neighboring property owners complained about the height of the towers. 
The New Mexico Supreme Court found that the county did not have a legit-
imate basis for stopping construction. The Court refused to find an implied 
"reasonableness" requirement in the ordinance as a consideration in determin-
ing "customarily incidental" use. "While we agree tha t the Planning Commis-
sion could pass regulations to restrict the height of amateur radio towers as a 
customarily incidental use, the Planning Commission has not done so. We will 
not read a reasonableness requirement into the ordinance to alleviate a problem 
that easily could have been avoided some time ago." 110 P.3d at 502. The Court 
added tha t cases from other states supported the position tha t "amateur radio 
an tennas are generally considered customarily incidental to resident ia l use 
without adding a reasonableness inquiry." 110 P.3d at 502. 
The Court also found that the county's interpretation of the ordinance was 
not entitled to deference because the county had changed its position. "It was 
only after neighbors complained that the County concluded that the towers did 
not comply with the zoning ordinance. These facts strongly suggest t ha t the 
County was implementing a new policy. Under these circumstances, deference 
is not appropr ia te . . . . [A]n ini t ial in terpre ta t ion of an ordinance by an 
administrative agency constitutes a de facto policy tha t would be improper for 
local officials to change non-iegislatively." 110 P.3d at 503, 504. 
The Court summed up its decision as follows: 
The results of this case may be unfortunate for the neighbors who understandably 
regard Plaintiffs radio towers as an eyesore. But Plaintiff fairly relied on the express 
language of the ordinance and the assurances of the county zoning officials in buying 
his property. After the County granted Plaintiff a permit, he complied with its terms 
in the construction of bis radio antenna towers. If the County wanted to prevent tow-
ers on this scale, the problem could easily have been avoided by doing exactly what 
has been done since: expressly amending the ordinance with specific height 
limitations. . . .The County has every right and responsibility to regulate structures 
such as amateur radio towers, but it did not do so explicitly and in fact exempted 
such antenna towers from height restrictions. The County cannot after the fact come" 
up with a new legal rationale to block an unpopular activity, which was previously 
permitted, to the detriment of a property owner who did everything in his power to 
follow the rules. 110 P.3d at 505. 
n. 14. 
Add to note 14: 
New Mexico: See also Smith v. Bernalillo County, 2005-NMSC-012, 137 
N.M. 280, 110 P.3d 496 (2005) (county could not prohibit the construction of two 
130-foot amateur radio towers on residential property), discussed herein at note 
13, supra. 
Add new text after note 19, in the paragraph beginning "The 
word 'customary' is commonly used . . . " 
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